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The diary provides an extensive record of the political developments which took 
place in Surakarta over these years. Its information is not, however, presented as 
a continuous narrative, and the author never supplies a resume of previous events; 
nor does she set her narrative within a framework of political theory. It therefore 
often appears cryptic to an outsider, and more so on those occasions where it is 
clear that the diarist herself was not party to the political strategies of all those 
involved in the developments unfolding as she wrote. Even MangkunSgara himself, 
with whom the diarist was closest, may at times have had reason to be less than 
frank and open with her about his intentions. Nevertheless, the general trend of 
developments in the different relationships involved could not be kept secret, and 
angry interviews and hurried nocturnal consultations did not escape the notice of 
the court abdi (retainers). It is clear too that MangkunSgara liked to maintain the 
morale of his followers by keeping them informed of any political gain he felt he 
had made, or any stand he took for what he believed was right. Because of the 
sometimes artless, sometimes summary, style of the diarist, and the sparseness of 
her interpretative comment, the present writer has found it essential to use the 
letters of V .O .C. officials, reporting on the political developments they saw, to 
fill in the lacunae and elucidate the way in which a linked series of events unfolded 
in Surakarta over this period: on their own, the entries of the diary often appear 
as a series of not obviously connected stills, like the changing pictures of a bio­
scope. The material of the diary has not been amalgamated with that from the 
V.O .C. archives, however: the testimony of the diarist is presented in italics 
followed by the data from V.O.C. archives and the present writer's comments and 
explanations. By this separation, it is hoped that the reader may be able to form 
some idea of the perceptions of the two sides of a particular political and cultural 
encounter, and to see where they diverge and where they coincide. It should be 
noted that only entries dealing with political events of major importance have been 
included, and that many others, noting less important "political" events, 1 have
* Part I of this article appeared in Indonesia, 29 (April 1980), pp. 1-46. The 
diary, written by a "lady scribe and soldier" at the court of MangkunSgara I , 
covers the period 1781-91. The manuscript is KITLV Or [Koninklijk Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Oriental Ms.] No. 231 of the collection of the Insti­
tute at Leiden. All references to the diary (which comprises 303 large double 
pages) will only cite the relevant page number, with L or R to signify the left or 
right side of the double page.
1. Omission of this detail weakens, however, the impression that the diary gives of 
a fairly high level of political turbulence: see below p. 109.
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been omitted in the interests of brevity and relative coherence of presentation. 
Developments are presented in simple chronological order, as they occur in the 
diary. Initially, it had seemed that a better analytical perspective might be 
achieved by analyzing the different relationships involved—between the Mangku- 
nSgaran and the Pakubuwanan houses, between the Pakubuwanan and the V .O .C ., 
between the MangkunSgaran and Yogyakarta, etc.—under separate headings, but 
this separation was impossible to maintain, for developments (or even expected 
developments) in one relationship clearly very much affected the balance of others.
*  *  *
Prelude
The first entry dealing with political affairs of major importance occurs under 
Slasa-Pon 26 Sapar 1710 AJ [Tuesday, January 20, 1784 AD] recording that the 
Dutch Resident [F. C. van Straalendorff] grave MangkunSgara a letter from the 
Governor o f the northeast coast [Johannes Siberg], promising him the V.O .C.'s 
protection both for himself and for his descendants provided they remained allies 
of the Company. 2 Furthermore, MangkunSgara was promised the succession to the 
throne o f Mataram3 4if the Sultan should die.
In the events of 1790-91, an alleged undertaking by Siberg that MangkunSgara 
would become ruler of Yogyakarta if the first Sultan predeceased him was to be a 
major factor in the maneuvers of the different parties. This record in the diary 
supports the interpretation that MangkunSgara, at least, genuinely believed that 
such an undertaking had been made by a representative of the V.O .C. As regards 
the second part of the entry, it is noticeable how, even outside times of crisis or 
of succession to the throne, the MangkunSgaran was very conscious of the prox­
imity of Yogyakarta. There are a number of entries in the diary reporting the 
presence of Mataram "sp ies,"1* presumably with a reciprocal interest in Surakarta.
In Puasa 1712 [July 1786] "letters from Mecca" arrived in the mosques of Sala, 
Pranaraga, and Patiyaniman [??]. These were "Arabic letters calling on the for­
getful to come to their sen ses ,"5 and were "suppressed"6 by the Sunan.
The diarist's entry on these admonitory letters is unfortunately very brief— 
unfortunately, because it tells us only enough to know that these letters must have 
been in the same vein as two which were discovered in Surakarta nearly eighteen 
months later, and which caused Greeve, Siberg's successor as Governor of the 
northeast coast, a great deal of concern on account of their political implications. 7
2. 31R. It was this same letter, as reported by the diarist, which exempted 
MangkunSgara from observing the awisan: see Part I, p. 38.
3. The two major successor states to the former kingdom of Mataram are usually 
known as the Sunanate of Surakarta and the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Because 
Yogyakarta was situated in the region of Mataram, however, it inherited the old 
name, which is often used by the diarist. She also uses the toponym Sala (pronun­
ciation and modern spelling Solo) much more frequently than the official designa­
tion Surakarta to refer to the kraton (nSgri sala), its ruler (prabu sala) and his 
people (wong sala).
4. " tSlik m a ta ra m see, for example, 68R, 169R, 211L.
5. "surat arab ingkang lali kinen emut" (81L).
6. "sinilSp" (ib id .).
7. See Greeve to Batavia, January 1, 1788, in Koloniaal Archief [henceforth KA]
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Greeve's two letters purport to be from a king who is "from Mecca" but has a 
Javanese title (Susuhunan Ayunjaya Adimurti Senapati Ingalaga) and who will come 
soon and displace the present king of Sala. The latter is described as dishonoring 
his royal and priestly forbears, being himself nothing less than the Devil's king, a 
rebel against God and the angels, an enemy of his country, one who gives no good 
law, and in whose land food and clothing are expensive and rain scarce. The let­
ters comment sharply on the present ruler's alliance with the Europeans ("A King 
of the Europeans, you please God no more; it is finished with you; get out, you 
apostate from the Faith!") and deride his reliance upon them. ("Shall the Euro­
peans, then, indeed be more powerful than God?") They are couched in esoteric 
terminology and make reference to omens such as rainbows of different colors.
There is a gap of some eighteen months between the letters reported by the 
diarist and those reported by V .O .C . officials: the diarist mentions no later letters, 
the V.O.C. officials no earlier ones. Were they the same letters? It is unlikely 
that they would have remained in circulation for so long, especially if, as the dia­
rist claims, the Sunan wished to suppress them. It seems more probable that the 
phenomenon of prophetic, warning letters was more widespread than the V.O.C. 
was aware: Arabic letters posted in mosques were not likely to come to the atten­
tion of the Dutch representation, especially since it was then led by the highly un­
reliable and self-interested Palm. The circumstance that the letters reported by 
the diarist were posted in the fasting-month lends support to this supposition, for 
this was the time of year when a devout Muslim could be expected to call on his co­
religionists to remember their religious duties. The evidence of the diary also 
shows that such letters were posted as mosques in places outside the capital (one 
of them in a region, Pranaraga, where MangkunSgara's sons held appanages). 
Finally, the Sunan's suppression of the earlier letters suggests that they too were 
unflattering in their description of his rule.
In the same month, Raden Mas Kareta, half-brother of Mangkunttgara and father 
of Wirakusuma, returned to Sala from exile. 8
As we shall see, these relatives of MangkunSgara, and particularly Wirakusuma, 
were shortly to achieve importance through the actions of the Crown Prince, heir 
to Pakubuwana III.
At the end of the month of Dulkaidah 1712 AJ [late September 1786] 160 Yogya- 
karta soldiers from two prajurit corps visited Sala and gave bSksa performances 
for the Sunan, as well as in the Dutch loji [factory]. 9
After the death of the Dutch (First) Resident Palm in 1789, the Sunan's court 
made serious complaints to Governor Greeve about Palm's behavior, which are dis­
cussed below. Among the numerous grievances listed was that Palm had compelled 
the kraton to receive a dance-party from Yogyakarta.10
3708, Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie Overgekomen Berichten [henceforth 
VOCOB], 1789, where a Dutch translation or paraphrase of the letters is appended. 
Extracts from these letters are translated into English in M. C. Ricklefs, Jogja­
karta under Sultan Mangkubumi 17U9-1792: A History o f the Division of Java (Lon­
don: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 288-91. Note however that Ricklefs' 
"first letter" is the second of the two appended to Greeve's letter of January 1, 
and vice versa.
8. 81.
9. 85L, 88L.
10. See Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1789, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. Greeve says
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The Formation o f an Alliance
On 14 Rabiulakir 1713 AJ [February 3, 1787 AD] the Sunan's Patih, Jayaning- 
rat, came to ask Mangkun&gara whether he dared to intensify his quarrel with the 
Sultan of Mataram, or not; to which Mangkun&gara replied that the intensification 
or slackening-off of the quarrel would be according to what the Sunan himself de­
sired: he, MangkunSgara, would accede to either decision. 11
A couple o f months later Mangkun^gara's son, Raden Suryakusuma, whose 
appanage was in Pranaraga, married the Sunan's daughter, Raden Ayu Supiyah.
The preparations for, and celebration of, the marriage are described in some de­
tail. 12
Eight people were arrested on the order of the Sunan. These were Wirakusuma, 
the Crown Prince's Patih, and his associates, including one woman and a certain 
Haji Jakariya.
Shortly after this, the Sunan requested MangkunSgara to appoint one o f his 
men, Nur BSsari, one o f the MangkunSgaran kaum, as a sort of liaison officer with 
the Sunan's establishment, so that the two houses would be able to work things 
out together. 13
Listed thus without context or background, these events do not immediately 
suggest that significant developments were underway in Surakarta. From the ar­
chival records, however, it is clear that the Crown Prince, though still very young, 
was already attempting to impose his own ideas. A letter from Palm to Siberg in 
April 1787 mentions that the recently returned Raden Mas Kareta had been permit­
ted by Pakubuwana III to wear the European clothes (complete with wig) which he 
favored, but that the Crown Prince had forced him to revert to traditional Javanese 
attire. 1‘t This was in the context of the Crown Prince's association with "Muslim 
Popes" who had even, according to Palm, begun attacking the Sultan of Mataram's 
subjects and driving them from their rice-fields. These men, among them Wiraku­
suma, were subsequently exiled by the Dutch at the request of the old Sunan, and 
the Crown Prince even thanked the Resident—or so the Resident reported15—for
only that this happened "some time ago," but Ricklefs dates the visit to 1785 on 
the basis of Yogyakarta sources. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284 n. and p. 298.
There seems no reason to doubt the diarist's date, however, in view of her usual 
accuracy when checked against archival records, and it seems both from the diary 
and from Greeve's letter than only one visit was made.
11. 101: nulya ing mal£m jumungah /  tanggal kawan wSlas ing rabiyolakir /  papa- 
tih janingrat rawuh /  sowan pangran dipatya /  pinanggiyan ing kamar asuka 
r&mbug /  pab&n lan wong kasultanan /  pangran dipati tinari II purunZn k£nc%ng 
lan nora /  aturira pangran dipatya /  punapa karsaning ratu /  sumongga karsa 
nata /  kSncSng tumut lamun k&ndo inggih tumut /  punapa karsaning nata /  pang­
ran dipati umiring II. Two syllables are lacking from the second line of the second 
verse; the last vowel here should be an i.
12. 98-110. See also Part I, pp. 36-37.
13. 111-112.
14. 2. Siberg to Batavia, April 26, 1787, in KA 3655, VOCOB, 1788. These 
events are also described in Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 270 and pp. 287-88. Note 
however that R. M. Kareta was not MangkunSgara's brother but his half-brother, 
and that Ricklefs incorrectly reconstructs his name as "Kreti."
15. See Siberg to Batavia, July 13, 1787, in KA 3655, VOCOB, 1788.
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showing him what evil counselors they had been. But the elements present in this 
episode— Islam, nativism and aggression towards Mataram—were to recur in the 
Crown Prince's later career as Sunan Pakubuwana IV. As late as 1792 (that is, 
after the timespan of the diary), he was to request the V.O .C. to allow Wirakusuma 
to return from exile, a request which was, however, refused.16
The second important development began with the first tentative steps towards 
an alliance between the Sunan's house and the Mangkunggaran. In view of the dif­
ficulties this would later produce for the V .O .C ., it is ironic that the Company 
itself had first used its influence in promoting the alliance, for the marriage be­
tween Mangkunggara's son and the Sunan's daughter was arranged only after 
Palm's intervention. The Sunan had already refused three times to give a daugh­
ter to a prince of the Mangkunggaran.17 From the diary it becomes clear that at 
the same time as the Sunan was being pressed by the V.O.C. to consent to this 
marriage, he was sounding out Mangkunggara to see if he could count on him as an 
ally against Mataram. And after the marriage went through, we see the appoint­
ment of a liaison officer, Nur Bgsari, for cooperation between the two houses.
Early in 1714 AJ the Sunan's men were hard at work reconstructing the pag&- 
laran and leveling the alun-alun. The Sunan asked Mangkun&gara to provide men 
for this work, but Mangkun&gara declined to do so . 18 Evidently the Resident had 
supported or prompted the Sunan's request, for some time later, on 19 Mulud 
[December 29, 1787] the former came to visit Mangkun&gara in a bitter mood, and 
accused the prince o f carrying tales to the Governor o f the northeast coast [pre­
sumably in the letter which he had recently despatched but whose contents are 
not recorded by the diarist]. Mangkun&gara replied that there had now been five 
Residents and four Patih, 19 but he had never before been required to do this work: 
his obligations were only to work on the loji and the P&ngging canal; 20 and to see 
that his taxes were paid. He went on to say that he had not appeared in audience 
at the Gar&b&g celebrations because the Sunan had been sick: he had in fact been 
prevented from visiting him. It would be improper for him to be seen in public 
eating and drinking at a celebration while the ruler was sick. He then refused the 
Resident's invitation to celebrate the Dutch New Year at the loji for the same rea­
son, and Palm retired. The diarist comments that he was in the wrong, and looked 
it.
Mangkunggara was not the only member of the Surakarta aristocracy who had a 
quarrel with Palm. Resident Palm died on May 11, 1788, 21 and it was only then 
that Greeve realized that something was seriously wrong. The Sunan's court com­
plained that (apart from insulting them by such offenses against manners as the 
serving of "spoiled drinks" at receptions), Palm had interfered in their judicial 
decisions, and exacted an enormous amount of unpaid labor for building works, 
not only on the Company's buildings but also for his private benefit, beating and
16. See van Overstraten to Batavia, March 2, 1792, in KA 3859, VOCOB, 1793.
17. See Siberg to Batavia, March 23, 1787, in KA 3655, VOCOB, 1788.
18. 124.
19. That is, in Mangkunggara's time in Surakarta, and including the Resident 
and Patih of the time.
20. Maintenance of this canal was a fairly onerous task, for there were frequent 
breakthroughs of its water, leading to flooding.
21. Greeve to Batavia, May 12, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
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mistreating the laborers and keeping them from attending to their rice-fields. 22 
MangkunSgara was not the man to be browbeaten into undertaking more than his 
established obligations, and it was probably because of his obduracy over provid­
ing labor and his general resistance to Palm's high-handedness that the latter had 
reported him to Greeve for various misdemeanors. When Greeve informed Mangku­
nSgara of Palm's accusation that he had not attended the GarSbSg celebrations, 
MangkunSgara replied that he had been denied access to the palace, and Greeve 
then requested Palm not to offend the old prince. Palm assured the Governor that 
"no Javanese, much less MangkunSgara, has ever been offended by m e."23 24 A more 
serious accusation which Palm made at this time was that MangkunSgara was carry­
ing on a clandestine correspondence with his ex-wife, Ratu BSndara. (See further 
below.) This accusation is not recorded in the diary.
A maulana and indung2>t of MangkunSgara, by name Ki DSmak, was arrested on 
7 Rabiulakir 1714 AJ [January 16, 1788] because TumSnggung PuspanSgara25 told 
tales (wadul) to the Company. Six days later, PuspanSgara arrived unexpectedly 
at the MangkunSgaran to bring this message: the Sunan [Pakubuwana III] begged 
his elder brother's [ i . e . , MangkunSgara's] forgiveness for past errors and wrong 
actions. Furthermore, let him give advice and correction to the heir apparent, 
and to all the Sunan's TumSnggung and WSdana. Let him not forsake us!
This extraordinarily conciliating and respectful plea conveys the implication 
that Pakubuwana III well knew that MangkunSgara must have been tried to the 
limit by the arrest of his indung, and begged him to understand the circumstances 
which would compel the Sunan to execute Ki DSmak. The announcement of the exe­
cution came next day, when two messengers came from the Sunan asking MangkunS- 
gara's permission to have Ki DSmak torn to pieces on the morrow. The diarist says 
he was accused o f practicing sorcery on a certain Wringin Anom. MangkunSgara 
said only "As the king wishes"; and the execution—presided over by the Crown 
Prince in place of his ailing father, and witnessed by all the court, including the 
sSlir, and by the Dutch officials, but not by MangkunSgara—duly took place. Ki 
DSmak had his skin cut from his body and his throat cut; Ta[n]jung Anom was 
burnt. 26
22. See Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
23. See Greeve to Batavia, January 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
24. indung is a term used in a number of senses, for example, to denote a person 
who lives in his own house built on land owned by someone else (see G. P. Rouf- 
faer, "Vorstenlanden," Adatrechtbundels 134 [1931], p. 204). It seems likely in 
this context however that it denotes a kraton official of a particular rank, one be­
low those of panewu, wadana, and kliwon. (For the use of pangindung as a title 
of office, see Soeripto, Ontwikkelingsgang der vorstenlandsche wetboeken [Leiden: 
Ijdo, 1929], pp. 141-43; also G. J. Oudemans, Javaansche wetten en andere bepa- 
lingen, geldig in Jogjakarta ten dienste van landhuurders, beheerders en geemploi- 
eerden van ondernemingen en van den Javaansche ambtenaren in dat gewest [Yog- 
yakarta: Buning, 1897], 1, p. 142.)
25. A TumSnggung PuspanSgara had been dismissed from his position as an offi­
cer in Mangkunegara's "Kanoman" corps about a year and a half earlier, after being 
accused of highway robbery ( 83L). If this is the same man as the TumSnggung 
PuspanSgara who appears here as someone in the Sunan's service, he would have 
had an obvious reason to bear a grudge against MangkunSgara, and perhaps also 
have access to information about suspicious personages under his protection.
26. 133L-135L.
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Ki DSmak—according to the diarist a maulana, one distinguished in Islamic 
learning, and from his name perhaps an authority connected with the religious cen­
ter of DSmak—was accused by Palm of being the author of the two admonitory and 
"seditious" letters which had so worried Greeve, and, according to the Dutch rec­
ord, that was the reason for his execution. The "Tanjung Anom" executed with 
him was implicated in the same matter, for he was named as one of the envoys of 
the "ruler of Mecca" prophesied in the letters to come and displace the existing, 
compromised, ruler of Surakarta. 27 Immediately after Palm's death, Greeve re­
ceived a letter from Pakubuwana III which actually requested the Resident's dis­
missal, and, among many other complaints, claimed that Palm had enforced the 
burning of Ki DSmak, a form of sentence unheard of on Java. (The diarist, it will 
be noted, reports that while Tanjung Anom was burnt Ki DSmak suffered an even 
more barbarous end.) Greeve himself was never convinced that Ki DSmak was the 
real culprit, and the fact that the diarist makes no mention of any letters is not 
only surprising in view of the Dutch concern to find their author, but also sug­
gests that Ki DSmak and his associates in the MangkunSgaran really did have 
nothing to do with the letters. It seems that Palm had put pressure on the ailing 
Pakubuwana III to execute Ki DSmak and thus satisfy his superiors in the Company 
by providing a culprit. The Sunan had thus been caught between the pressure 
from Palm and the expected wrath of MangkunSgara at the execution of the maulana, 
who was under his protection—reinforced, it would seem, by the Crown Prince's 
resistance to Palm's attempts to force his wishes upon the court. At the same time 
as Greeve received news of the Surakarta court's numerous complaints about Palm 
(his action over Ki DSmak, his insults, his exactions of labor, and hid interference 
in the Sunan's jurisdiction over his subjects), he was also informed of the dismis­
sal of TumSnggung PuspanSgara, Palm's favorite, whom the Resident had forced 
the Sunan to appoint in preference to his own son-in-law. 28 Since PuspanSgara 
ended his career in the wilderness of Ayah (the usual place of exile from the Sura­
karta kraton) at the Crown Prince's instigation,29 it is likely that the Prince owed 
his dismissal to the same political adversary. One question remains as a matter 
of speculation: did one of those to whom Palm's demands were becoming more than 
could be tolerated—MangkunSgara himself, Pakubuwana III, or (a more likely can­
didate than his declining father) the Crown Prince—in fact find a release from the 
situation in poisoning the odious Resident? Greeve himself suspected that this 
might have been the case, and it may be that, while Pakubuwana had restricted 
himself to requesting Palm's dismissal, he had been forestalled by the more direct 
action of one of his relatives.
Palm was replaced by Andries Hartsinck, the Resident of RSmbang, whose 
appointment had been recommended by Greeve on May 12 and was ratified before 
June 12, when the new Resident set out for Surakarta. 30 When Greeve himself 
visited Surakarta, in August, he had the opportunity of discussing with Mangku­
nSgara Palm's accusation that he had been carrying on a clandestine correspon­
dence with his ex-wife, Ratu BSndara, who had been back with her father, the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta, for twenty-five years. MangkunSgara indignantly denied 
this accusation. On reviewing the reports he had received from the Yogyakarta 
Resident, van Ijsseldijk,31 which consistently stated that it was highly improbable
27. See Greeve to Batavia, January 29, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
28. Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
29. See 149L for the record of PuspanSgara's exile.
30. Greeve to Batavia, June 12, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
31. See, for example, van Ijsseldijk's letters of January 4 and 9, in KA 3708, 
VOCOB, 1789.
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that Ratu BSndara had either motivation or opportunity to carry on such a risky 
connection, Greeve concluded that Palm had in fact manufactured the description 
he had given (with much circumstantial and sentimental detail) of MangkunSgara's 
"confession" to him, "brother Palm," on January 5 .32 Such was the end of Palm's 
Residency and its legacy. His successor Hartsinck was to provide no fewer sur­
prises .
The diarist records another source of political turbulence in the region at the 
end o f Palm's period o f office and continuing into that o f his successor: the matter 
of Brangtakusuma. Palm is recorded as asking MangkuriSgara on 12 Rabiulakir 
1714 AJ [January 21, 1788] to arrest Brangtakusuma. On this matter too, Mang- 
kuri&gara refused to oblige Palm, but Brangtakusuma was nevertheless subsequent­
ly arrested and sent to SSmarang on 1 Besar 1714 AJ [September 2, 1788].
Brangtakusuma was one of the numerous sons of Pangeran Rangga of Jajar who 
were still at large in the Grobogan area. The family was revered because of their 
descent from the wall Sunan Kalijaga and Pangeran Rangga himself had been a 
rebel of exceptional reputation. It was alleged that MangkunSgara's eldest son, 
Pangeran Prabu Amijaya, had supported him, and this may have been the reason 
behind the MangkunSgaran's unwillingness to assist in the round-up of Rangga's 
sons, though Palm's general conduct would have made their cooperation unlikely 
even on neutral matters. Brangtakusuma and two of his brothers, Ranggakusuma 
and Sumawijaya, surrendered to Palm, and were interviewed by Greeve on his vis­
it to central Java. Greeve also hoped to persuade the Sultan of Yogyakarta to 
hand over four other brothers at this time. Subsequently, Brangtakusuma showed 
evidence that he did not really repent of his former lawless life, and was indeed 
sent off to SSmarang, on September 1st or 2nd. The two other brothers, appear­
ing more compliant, were provided with the means to live a settled life .33 34
On 21 Arwah 1714 AJ [May 27, 1788], not long after Palm's death and TumSng- 
gung PuspanSgara's dismissal, Pakubuwana III bestowed the title "Pangeran Mang- 
kubumi" on MangkunSgara's grandson, hitherto known as Pangeran Surya Mataram 
(and as a boy as Raden Mas Sadat). 3I* On 21 Dulkaidah [August 23, 1788], how­
ever, the Resident came to the MangkunSgaran kraton to ask that the name be 
changed: the Sunan had given in to pressure from the Company. Discussions be­
tween the Sunan, the Company, and MangkunSgara followed. The Resident pro­
posed the name "Natakusuma," which MangkunSgara favored; the Sunan suggested 
"Candrakusuma. " Eventually, "Surya Prang Wadana" was agreed upon; but the 
young prince felt great shame at his change of name, and in the Mangkuri&garan 
kraton was called simply "Pangeran Wetan" ("the Prince of the East"). 35
While the discussions over the name were taking place, the Crown Prince of 
Mataram made a trip to D&langgu with three relatives and his army. The Resident 
came to tell Mangkuri&gara to be on his guard, and the prince gave orders to his 
army to defend Surakarta. A party of the Slite corps was sent out to DSlanggu but 
found that the Crown Prince had turned back the same day.
32. See Palm's letter of January 6, appended in Greeve to Batavia, January 12, 
1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
33. See Greeve to Batavia, August 29, September 3, and September 10, in KA 
3708, VOCOB, 1789.
34. 148R. R. M. Sadat had celebrated his fourteenth birthday on 15 Arwah 
1707 AJ [August 6, 1781 AD] —4R.
35. 148R-166R.
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These events—the bestowing of the name "Mangkubumi" and the hostile reac­
tion to this act which followed from the side of Yogyakarta—were to be repeated 
almost exactly in the more serious political crisis of 1790.
The information which Greeve's letters give on the events of 1788 is as follows: 
on June 12 the bestowal of the new name on Pangeran Surya Mataram 36 was noted. 
On August 22, following upon his visit to Yogyakarta, Greeve wrote to Resident 
Hartsinck asking him to request MangkunSgara to agree to accepting another name, 
which would be given in the name of the "keijzer" (the Sunan) and the Company, and 
therefore carry even greater honor to the recipient: the Sunan had already agreed 
to this after Greeve had talked to him. It appears that the Sultan of Yogyakarta 
had not actually objected to the name Mangkubumi until he heard of the excessive 
exuberance and glee which MangkunSgara had displayed over the matter. 37 After 
this, the Sultan went so far as to tell his Patih,DanurSja,in the presence of the 
Yogyakarta Resident van Ijsseldijk that, if any Surakarta men committed offenses 
(such as cattle stealing or other aggressions) against his people, they should be 
put to death. Van Ijsseldijk expostulated that assaults against subjects of the 
other principality were always dealt with by the intervention of the Residents (and 
not by direct reprisal), and evil consequences would follow if this arrangement 
were to be abandoned. The Sultan replied that that would not be on his head, and 
that the name should be withdrawn within ten days. 38 On September 2, Hartsinck 
reported to Greeve the intrusion of the "large party of armed men" under the com­
mand of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince together with Pangeran Ingabei and Pange­
ran Dipakusuma (also given as Jayakusuma) to DSlanggu. Later, it appeared that 
the Sultan had in fact sent out a second armed party.39 401
When asked to account for this incident, the Sultan told van Ijsseldijk that 
the Crown Prince had acted without his knowledge and would be reprimanded. He 
added, however, that he must have taken this action because he was "his father's 
son," and could not bear to think of anyone else claiming equality with his father 
(by assuming the name he had borne as a prince).1*0 Ricklefs is of the opinion 
that the DSlanggu trip was probably without aggressive intention.1*1 However, 
although it is impossible to know with certainty how far he might have gone, the 
Sultan's earlier instructions to DanurSja and the fact that he sent out a second 
armed party, taken together, indicate a strong and direct reaction from Yogya­
karta. Greeve's own guess was that the Sultan was trying to see what impact a
36. According to Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 262 and 300, the name "Surya Mataram" 
had been disallowed by the Company in 1780. This does not accord with the evi­
dence of the diary (where it is used for this prince up until the granting of the 
name "Mangkubumi"), nor with this letter, where Surya Mataram is described as a 
"grandson of the Sunan and son of Pangeran Prabu." He was the son of Pangeran 
(Arya) Prabu (Amijaya), MangkunSgara's eldest son, and a daughter of Pakubu- 
wana III.
37. See Greeve to Hartsinck, August 22, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, August 
29, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
38. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, August 28, and the Sultan to Greeve, August 
29, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, September 3, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
39. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, September 6, in Greeve to Batavia, September 
10, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
40. See Greeve to Batavia, September 10, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
41. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 307-8.
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surprise attack would have on Sala, where Pakubuwana III was in a very weak 
condition, while at the same time expressing his old hatred for MangkunSgara.
In Java many names could only be taken by people of a certain rank. For 
obvious reasons, names such as Buminata ("ruler of the world") and Mangkubumi 
("he who holds the world in his lap") were the prerogatives of royalty. When a 
further crisis arose the following year over the second bestowal of the name 
"Mangkubumi" in Surakarta, the Sultan went so far as to state in a letter to the 
Company that no two people could have the same name. He claimed that he in­
tended to change the name of his son-in-law Jayaningrat in order not to offend 
the Surakarta Patih of the same name, who was senior to him; and gave further 
examples of a junior person being required to give up a certain name already 
borne by a senior.1*2 Yet it seems that this principle was not applied in any uni­
form or straightforward manner, at least now that there were three courts more 
concerned with maintaining their independence of action than with cooperation. 
Pakubuwana IV was to claim, when the second "Mangkubumi" affair arose, that this 
name was not currently borne by the Sultan and could therefore be taken by some­
one else. It may also be noted that "MangkunSgara" was part of the title of the 
Yogyakarta Crown Prince (as of all Mataram crown princes) yet was also promi­
nently displayed in Surakarta. It is clear that the fact that "Mangkubumi" had 
been the Sultan's own name, and that its bestowal on a MangkunSgaran prince 
had been the occasion for triumphant exuberance, had given particular offense.
Yet Pakubuwana III also vetoed "Natakusuma," favored by MangkunSgara, on the 
grounds that it was currently borne by a Yogyakarta prince, and would therefore 
be likely to give rise to further opposition from that side.1*3
While noting the humiliation which the withdrawal of the title "Mangkubumi" 
had caused in the MangkunSgaran, the diarist also makes it quite clear that the 
cause of this humiliation was pressure applied by the Company, in response to the 
reaction from the Sultan of Mataram over the appropriation of "his" name. Though 
the Sunan, now very sick, had given way before this pressure he was not himself 
complicit in the humiliation: rather, he was doing a great deal to improve the for­
tunes of MangkunSgara's sons. Before the Company asked that the name Mangku­
bumi be withdrawn, the Sunan had agreed to provide SuryamSrjaya with an appa­
nage in Wirasaba, and also to elevate Suryakusuma, who was married to the Sunan's 
daughter, to the rank of Pangeran (he became Pangeran Purbanagara) and to in­
crease his appanage lands with the addition of TrSnggalek. 1*1* After the withdrawal 
of the title Mangkubumi, a messenger came from the Sunan to the MangkunSgaran 
announcing that yet another of MangkunSgara's sons, Suryadimurti, would be given 
a position in MamSnang: this was apparently unsolicited. He also sent a very con­
ciliatory message assuring MangkunSgara that he had unqualified authority over 
all his MangkunSgaran subjects and owed no one service, and so might carry on 
his business free of envy. 4235
42. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, April 29, 1790, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, 
May 19, in KA 3802, VOCOB , 1791.
43. See Greeve to Batavia, September 10, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
44. 153R-158L. See Part I, pp. 44-46, on the courting of the V.O.C. by marks 
of honor and ceremonial presents which the MangkunSgaran undertook in order to 
gain the Company's support for these appointments.
45. The passage reads: pangeran adipatya /  antuk jangji lan sang prabu /  mung 
eca anare ISnggah II mabarang saliring kardi /  kalilan kendSl kewala /  lir wong 
anggur upamine /  tan kSna den-iri karya /  eca neng dalSmira /  ing sawSwSngkona-
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The Sunan's overall plan appears to have been, not to humiliate the Mangku- 
nggaran, but to build it up, and at the same time to offer a calculated offense to 
the Sultan of Mataram, for in terms of aristocratic Javanese convention the be­
stowal of the name could be seen as nothing else.
As Pakubuwana Ill's last illness became graver, however, everyone concerned 
evidently became more fearful that something untoward would take place at his 
death.
The diarist comments on the lack o f trust between the Sunan and his son and 
the Company. 46 The Sunan suggested that, as he would not recover from his sick­
ness, his son should be elevated to the throne. According to the diarist, the Com­
pany officials feared that if this were done the Sultan of Mataram might make a 
similar request on behalf of his heir, 47 whom the V.O.C. was not willing to elevate 
as yet; so that a decision was postponed until the arrival of Governor Greeve. 
Though Greeve did agree to install the Crown Prince while his father was still 
alive, it was too late, for the old Sunan died just afterwards.
This is confirmed by Greeve who, in a letter of September 20, 1788, for exam­
p le ,48 remarked that, although it was desirable to effect a smooth change of reign, 
under Company supervision, before Pakubuwana III actually died, such a step had 
a major disadvantage. This was that it might encourage the considerably older 
Crown Prince of Yogyakarta to try to assume the throne, against anticipated oppo­
sition from the Sultan, whom Greeve saw as a "childish" old man, still, however, 
possessed of a strong desire to rule. On September 26, Greeve reported that he *2
nipun /  kabeh wong mangkunagaran / /  (166L).
The term wong anggur (also angguran or pSnanggur) denoted a class of villa­
gers who had no agricultural land of their own, and by extension (at least in cen­
tral Java where the obligation to perform compulsory labor services was tied to the 
ownership of land) a person not bound to fixed service and who could freely dis­
pose of his own time. (See C. Poensen, "lets over de Javaansche desa," Mededee- 
lingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap, 38 [1894], pp. 32 f f .)
It is probably the latter sense that the Sunan—or the diarist—had in mind when 
comparing MangkunSgara to a wong anggur. In other regions, the term angguran 
seems to have been used in a rather different sense. (See, for example, J. W. de 
Stoppelaar, Balambangansch Adatrecht [Wageningen: Veenman, 1927], pp. 16 ff. , 
25-26, 34, and 114, and F. Fokkens, Eindresume van het bij besluit van den Gou- 
verneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-lndie van 24 Juli 1888 no. 8 bevolen Onder- 
zoek naar de Verplichte Diensten der inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera 
(Gouvernements-landen) op last van Zijne Excellentie den Minister van Kolonien,
2 parts [Batavia: Jav. Boekhandel en Drukkerij, 1901-2], 1, p. 5; and 2, pp.
4-5.) Fokkens found that the villagers classified as (inter alia) angguran or 
penanggur were those who were allotted performance of certain services on behalf 
of the village head, in return for which they were exempted from other usual forms 
of service. Since the people in this category were often among the more well-to- 
do villagers, and since they could choose to substitute payment in cash or kind for 
their services to the village head, we should also see them as something of a privi­
leged group.
46. 167R.
47. The diarist records the appearance and seizure of two more "Mataram spies" 
at this juncture, indicating Yogyakarta's lively interest in developments in Sura­
karta ( 169R).
48. Greeve to Batavia, September 20, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
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had agreed to install the Sala Crown Prince, but on his return to the Dutch factory 
received news of Pakubuwana Ill's death.1*9
Reassertion of Political and. Cultural Autonomy
The heir to the throne now requested of Greeve that once he became Sunan 
the Company should not negate any decision he made with respect to his officials 
and relatives, or concerning the treatment of rebels; and the Governor is said to 
have agreed to this request, even assuring the future ruler that he could govern 
Resident Hartsinck like one o f his own Dipatis49 50 and that all his wishes would be 
carried out.
This seems at first sight a very remarkable amount of license for Greeve to 
have allowed the young Sunan. However, Greeve had been deeply concerned about 
the effect of Palm's high-handedness—his exorbitant requests for unpaid labor and 
his interference in the Sunan's administration of justice—in alienating the old Su­
nan and the Crown Prince. It is, therefore, not improbable that he did make some 
such undertaking to the latter—not, perhaps, a wise move. Letters written by the 
Company's officials give the impression of a curious determination to maintain a be­
lief in the—at bottom—"amiable" and "lovable" character they had ascribed to the 
future Pakubuwana IV. They failed to consider the possibility that the—to them— 
undesirable attitudes he sometimes displayed were not entirely an overlay which 
could be removed together with the "evil counselors" believed to have been respon­
sible for it. It was to become apparent when the Crown Prince assumed his father's 
powers that he had unexpectedly firm ideas as to the direction he would take, as 
well as a surprising ability to reject, however politely, considerable amounts of 
"fatherly" advice intended by Company officials to deflect him from his path.
It seems that all eyes were on MangkunSgara's reaction to the Sunan's death. 
The heir apparent presented him with a horse to "gain his favor" (m8n<j£t galih) ; 51 
and after the Sunan died, the Resident is said to have told the Governor of an old 
adat whereby the royal relatives were forbidden to enter the palace upon the mon­
arch's death. 52 The Governor, however, replied that times had changed (sejen 
mSngko lan ing nguni) and that it was not necessary to follow this adat since the 
relatives could not be "planning anything. " However, it was indeed better that 
MangkunSgara should not be allowed to enter the palace, for he was a man of 
stature and senior in rank (pg<je tur kap&rnah tuwa).
Greeve's letters provide evidence that MangkunSgara had actually attempted 
to use the occasion of Pakubuwana Ill's death to try to gain greater power for 
himself. He had apparently intended to enter the kraton with a large armed party,
49. Greeve to Batavia, September 26, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
50. 170L: ngandika anem dipati II panjaluk kula mring dika /  lamun sida kula dadi 
narpati /  barang kang wus kula saguh /  mring sakeh pra santana /  miwah kraman 
tanapi mantri tumZnggung /  akeh ya wong tutur ala /  kump[§]m sampun praduli II 
tan kSni aweh cilaka /  wong kump[§]ni yen wus kula saguhi /  dgZer iSga sauripun /  
inggih bSngr punika /  pan andika kinarya ratu tum&nggung /  kaluhuraning kuwasa /  
nadyan upruk sala arsing II dika reh cara dipatya /  pan sakarsa-karsa andika 
kadadi . . .
51. 168.
52. The reason behind such a proscription is obvious, though its efficacy in de­
terring pretenders from challenging the designated heir could not have been very 
great.
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but was confined to his own residence by Greeve. It seems that Greeve had to 
impress strongly upon MangkunSgara that he owed homage to the new Sunan, Paku- 
buwana IV. On the occasion of the latter's investiture, the old prince showed no­
ticeable displeasure and made slighting remarks about the queen—Pakubuwana's 
second wife, the daughter of Pangeran Purbaya. MangkunSgara also made a re­
quest to be allowed to hold his 4,000 cacah as tax-free land, or to be given an­
other 600 cacah. This request was not granted.53 54 The diarist is silent on these 
unsuccessful bids for a stronger position.
Immediately after the burial of the royal corpse, the diarist records the arri­
val o f a letter from the Sultan of Mataram which caused great agitation in Sala. It 
was a letter of challenge (s&rat tunggul panantang) to Governor Greeve, which 
read: "Edelheer,51* you elevate my grandson55 as king. If you elevate MangkunS­
gara in title and appanage, I warn you, the world will not be in a good state. You 
will meet with trouble; all your works will be frustrated, if I am still king. " 56
The letter referred to here must be an undated one to Greeve,57 wherein the 
Sultan says that he is pleased with the elevation of the Surakarta Crown Prince 
but that, if MangkunSgara or his children ask the Company for greater fortune or 
for the kraton of Surakarta, it will not be agreeable to him. He claims also to have 
told Hartingh at the time of Gianti [1755] that MangkunSgara's descendants would 
be, like those of Surapati, enemies of the Company for seven generations. (The 
consistency with which Surapati's descendants had fought on the side aligned 
against the Dutch in a series of wars had made them something of a legend on 
Java.) In view of the outstanding loyalty of later MangkunSgaran princes to the 
colonial government, however, the Sultan's forecast was not an accurate one, 
though it may perhaps be indicative of the strong anti-Dutch sentiment he per­
ceived in his erstwhile ally, MangkunSgara.
On reading this letter, the Governor smiled, though he went red in the face 
and inwardly his heart burned. He showed it to the Resident, who was even less 
able to conceal his emotion, and ordered 400 troops to be on the alert at all times, 
and ammunition to be brought from SSmarang. He said that, although he had 
arranged with the dead Sunan to elevate his son on 4 Sura 1715 AJ [October 5,
1788 AD ], he would not wait for this date. Stating that it was the Company's bur­
den to raise kings, he went to see the heir to the throne who reacted strongly, 
saying: "Sala and Mataram do not give one another orders, and if I wish to elevate 
my uncle [MangkunSgara] in title or in land, it is not under the jurisdiction of
53. See MangkunSgara's letter of September 26, 1788, and Greeve to Batavia, 
September 26, October 1, and October 15, 1788, in KA 37 08, VOCOB, 1789.
54. Jav. dSier (Dutch edelheer, title of a member of the Raad van IndiS, Gover­
nor-General's Council) is always used when referring to the Governor of the north­
east coast.
55. putu (like raka, elder brother and other similar terms) is used for a wider 
spectrum of relationships than its English translation, "grandson." Here it refers 
to the Sultan's great-nephew, the young Pakubuwana IV.
56. 171L: dSier sira ngadSgSna /  raja marang putuku ki dipati /  ngadSg ratu 
putuningsun /  lamun mangkunagara /  yen mundaka namane lan kang lulungguh /  
ingsun peling marang sira /  ySkti jagat nora bScik II nSmu ewuh lakunira /  gawe- 
nira mabarang nora dadi /  yen sun maksih madSg ratu /
57. This letter from the Sultan to Greeve was enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, 
October 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
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Yogyakarta: Why should the Yogya people take any notice? It is as if they wish 
to test me. Well, let them try me. Uncle is still strong in battle. " se
The Governor calmed him, saying that it was the Company who would make 
him king, and that they would keep guard, for a year if necessary. The enthrone­
ment took place on Monday 29th Besar 1714 AJ. 58 9
A couple o f months after Pakubuwana IV's accession, an incident occurred in 
the Mangkun&garan in which MangkunSgara's Dutch coachman, "£5pit"60 was stabbed 
by a lurah named Wijanarka. He had been quarrelling with the lurah and had 
struck him. Wijanarka was immediately seized and handed over to the Resident, 
and the coachman was given an [unspecified] amount o f money in compensation. 
However, the diarist saw this affair as typifying the dominant characteristics of 
the MangkunSgaran men: they are fearless without exception and do not suffer 
blows without retaliating. They are unafraid o f death in battle, like the Pangeran 
Buminata and Singasari, following their commander even against a figure of such 
seniority as the old Sunan.61
58. 171R-172L. His words were: nora prentah-pinarentah /  wong sala lan wong 
matawis / /  nadyan ingsun ngundakSna / nama agSng marang uwa dipati /  muwuhana 
sawahipun /  dudu bawah wong yogya /  ya pagene praduli wong yogya iku /  pama 
arSp ngayonana /  wong yogya mring awak mami II eh payo den ayonana /  maksih 
kSncSng si uwa ing ajurit I . .  .
59. In fact it took place on 28th BSsar, i . e . , September 29, 1788. See Pakubu­
wana IV's letter of October 3 to the Prince of Orange and Nassau, enclosed in 
Greeve to Batavia, October 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. As September 29 
(28th BSsar) was a Monday, it seems that the diarist has given the wrong date to 
the day.
60. This must refer to MangkunSgara’s equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, who 
was later, in 1790, to be the principal channel of communication between the Mang- 
kunSgaran household, which was then set on a collision course with the V .O .C ., 
and Governor Greeve. See below, p. 93.
61. These two princes, Buminata and Singasari, brothers of Pakubuwana II, were 
extremely important figures in MangkunSgara’s career, for they had been his close, 
if not constant, companions through many troubled years. They had gone into re­
bellion in 1743 and, according to a Babad which describes the "Chinese war," were 
with MangkunSgara when he assumed his royal title (Pangeran Adipati Anom Mang­
kunSgara) and status, shortly after his break with the Sunan who had been pro­
claimed by the pro-Chinese party. This Sunan (Raden Mas GarSndi, the "yellow 
Sunan") was now about to surrender to the V.O.C. (See Babad Petjina [Semarang: 
van Dorp, 1874], pp. 397-412.)
Singasari, like MangkunSgara only a teenager in 1743, fought on his side in a 
number of major battles (such as the attack on Surakarta on July 28, 1750—see 
Part I, p. 10). Unlike MangkunSgara, however, he was never to surrender either 
to the V.O.C. or to any Javanese ruler, and he remained at large in the Malang 
region, joining forces with Surapati’s descendants, until he was finally captured 
in 1768 by the V.O .C. expedition against Balambangan. He died in chains in Bata­
via before he could be exiled. There seems to have been a significant Islamic ele­
ment among his following in Malang, and this may have been a cultural characteris­
tic which he had in common with MangkunSgara (on Singasari, see Ricklefs, 
Jogjakarta, pp. 130-38).
Buminata’s career was more chequered. In September 1749 he submitted to 
Pakubuwana II and the Company, and on December 15 of that year he was made
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She tells the story of a lurah who with his carpenter's adze killed a thief and 
was promoted into the priyayi ( the adze itself was also promoted and became an 
item of the regalia), and of the Pangeran Dipati's peacock which attacked and 
wounded a messenger of the Sunan who was coming and going rather too frequent­
ly; and then digresses with an account of the other household animals who could 
"think like human beings."62 634
The lurah whose action gave rise to this celebration of the martial spirit of 
the Mangkun&garan was sentenced to be set to fight a tiger on KSmis 6 Jumadila- 
kir 1715 AJ [March 4, 1789] 63 but was at the last moment pardoned by the Sunan. 
Instead, one o f the relatively infrequent tiger-buffalo contests was held, and the 
Resident saw the tiger die.
It is surprising to find no record of this stabbing of Bloemhart, which must 
surely have made quite a stir in both Dutch and Javanese circles in Surakarta, in 
the archival letters of the time. There are in fact no letters at all relating to cen­
tral Javanese affairs between November 10 and December 24, 1788.65 Nor is there 
any record of the planned execution and eventual pardon of the attacker in March 
1789.66 This is presumably another example of Resident Hartsinck's practice of 
not reporting bad news from Surakarta for as long as he could avoid it. (See be­
low , pp . 86- 87.) The whole affair as reported in the diary is uncannily like the 
account of an attack made by one of the officers of the Sultan of Yogyakarta on a 
V.O .C. dragoon in 1783.67 In this case too the offender was ultimately pardoned, 
and, in place of a fight between him and a tiger, a tiger-buffalo fight was held.
Scarcely half a year after his succession, Pakubuwana IV sacked a number of 
those who had held office under his father and replaced them with new men.68 In 
this reshuffling the MangkunSgaran house gained rather than lost and accordingly 
moved closer to the Sunan: Pangeran Prang V/adana was assured by Pakubuwana 
that he would give his blessing to a hereditary succession in Mangkuri&gara's line 
and was himself given a certain authority over the other children of the family and 
their landholdings.69 Subsequent to the sacking of two tumSnggung in Pranaraga, 
a son of Mangkun&gara (PadmanSgara, now bearing the title of Pangeran Ary a) 
was appointed over their combined holdings, amounting to 6,000 cacah.70 The
Crown Prince, to succeed the newly-installed Pakubuwana III (son of Pakubuwana 
II, and thus nephew of Buminata). He rebelled again, however, at the beginning 
of 1753, submitting once more to the Company two years later. He was exiled to 
Banda and then to Ceylon, where he died in 1783, at which time Pakubuwana III 
still refused permission for his descendants to return to Java. (See P. J. F. Louw, 
De derde Javaansche Successie-Oorlog [Batavia: Albrecht & Rusche, 1889], pp. 
26-33 and 73, and Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 90.) The "old Sunan" referred to by 
the diarist is more likely to have been Pakubuwana II than Pakubuwana III.
62. 180.
63. Either the day or the date is incorrect here: 6 Jumadilakir/March 4 was not a 
Tuesday but a Wednesday.
64. 191R-192L.
65. See KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789, and KA 3754, VOCOB , 1790.
66. KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
67. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 274-75.
68. See, for example, 187R, 195L.
69. 198R.
70. 206.
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diarist records that MangkunSgara was not privy to this decision but accepted the 
command o f the Sunan and the decree o f God with appropriate concurrence. In 
other passages too it is recorded that MangkunSgara's sons acted independently 
and not always in a way of which their father approved. Later, for instance, 
Pangeran PadmanSgara conspired with Pangeran PurbanSgara, who also had an 
appanage in Pranaraga, to petition the Sunan to remove two other sons o f Mangku­
nSgara, Suryataruna and Suryakusuma, from their appanages in KSdiri, give these 
to PurbanSgara, and amalgamate the two Pranaraga appanages under PadmanSgara. 
The Sunan did give PurbanSgara the combined KSdiri appanages, but did not simi­
larly increase PadmanSgara's holdings (he gained half of PurbanSgara's old appa­
nage but had to give half o f his own Pranaraga appanage to Suryataruna. Surya­
kusuma was given an appanage in Pace). MangkunSgara deeply disapproved of 
this attempt by two o f his sons to take their brothers' lands.71
At the same time as his sons were being advanced, MangkunSgara himself 
dreamed that all the houses of the Dutch and Chinese, and the residence o f Pange­
ran Purbaya, were burnt down one night. MangkunSgara was also having discus­
sions with the young Sunan about "standing firm" on all matters, though no agree­
ment had yet been reached.72 734 Somewhat later the Resident, worried about the 
three guru the Sunan had chosen and by the Sunan's completely altered behavior 
and his refusal to sign a contract put forward by the Company [see below], de­
cided to ask MangkunSgara for counsel. The diarist records that the Resident 
maintained secret communications with MangkunSgara, and that Governor Greeve 
regarded him "as a father.1,73
The new Sunan continued to appoint his own candidates to office: TumSnggung 
Wiraguna was sacked and replaced by a kliwon who was given the title Kanduruhan 
Wilatikta. 7h When the Sunan received a letter from Greeve requesting that his 
three guru, Raden Santri, Ki Saleh, and Bahman, be surrendered to the kumpSni, 
he did not comply but in fact elevated the first to the position o f wadana with the 
title TumSnggung Prawiradigda. V/iradika of Dayaluhur was dismissed and exiled 
from the kraton, for, according to the diarist, practicing sorcery on one o f the 
princesses. He was replaced by a certain Jalalen, described as a "cover" (aling) 
for the Sunan's three guru. Later, the diarist records the Dutch reaction to the 
appointment of Prawiradigda: the Resident and the Adjutant, both wearing Java­
nese clothing, paid a nocturnal visit to the ruler on 13 BSsar 1715 [September 4,
71. 235L. The appointment of Suryakusuma (he was the second of MangkunSgara's 
sons to be given this name, which had been borne by PurbanSgara until his eleva­
tion to the rank of Pangeran), previously named Suryadimurti and before that 
Raden Mas Samada or Samat, is mentioned in a rather unclear passage in an undated 
letter from MangkunSgara to Hartsinck, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, September 
10, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. The appointment of PadmanSgara is noted in 
Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
72. 199R-200L: rSbo wage ing siyam kang sasi /  taun alip ing dalu nupSna /  
pagriyan walandi kabeh /  lawan pacinan iku /  sami kobar [kobor] katingal wSngi /  
lan kobar [kobor] kapurbayan /  pangi[m]pening dalu /  sarSng sang prabu taruna /  
rSmbag kSncSng panggah saliring prakawis /  nanging dereng mupakat II
73. 203L-204L.
74. According to Schrieke, the title Kanduruwan Wilatikta was associated with the 
post of V/Sdana panumping II (= panSkar). See B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociologi­
cal Studies, vol. 2, Ruler and Realm in Early Java (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1969), 
pp. 172-73.
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1789] to ask why he had taken such a step. Pakubuwana replied that in this way 
he would find out whether the man was good or bad—and that, if the Governor 
wanted to know what a santri was like, he could send Prawiradigda to SSmarang.75
On July 19, 1789, Greeve's suspicions of the court at Surakarta were aroused 
by reports that the Sunan was plotting to slaughter all Europeans in Java. This 
information, from a young Javanese woman, was passed on to him not by the Sura­
karta Resident but by the Dutch Commandant at Salatiga. When Greeve asked 
Hartsinck to make an investigation, the latter reported that all was in order at the 
court except for the presence of two "popes," Raden Santri and Bahman, who had 
a wide following which included the Sunan, MangkunSgara's grandson Prang Wa- 
dana, and many other princes. It was owing to the influence of these "popes" that 
the Acte van Overeenkomst--an agreement laying down procedures for regulating 
trade and for solving problems that might arise between the principalities from dis­
putes over land and water rights and from theft, highway robbery, etc.--had not 
been signed: this is clearly the unspecified "contract" mentioned by the diarist. 
MangkunSgara himself had allegedly recommended that the Company "get rid of" 
these "popes" by secret means rather than enter into a confrontation with the 
young Sunan; but Greeve considered that this would be too risky. At the same 
time, the Yogyakarta Resident, van Ijsseldijk, reported that the kraton there had 
received information that Pakubuwana IV was making regular visits to the mosque, 
was burning all the European uniforms of his father's army, and in fact wished to 
drive the Europeans from Java altogether.76
In September, the numerous replacements made by the Sunan among his senior 
officials became known to Greeve. Resident Hartsinck denied that Wilatikta was a 
"pope," and claimed that he had just been appointed to replace a sick man. This 
is certainly in conflict with the diary, which represents Wilatikta as the chief of 
the Sunan's guru. Greeve was better informed about the type of man appointed as 
the new TumSnggung of Dayaluhur, but, again, the information came from a source 
other than Hartsinck. It was the Resident of TSgal, J. L. Umbgrove, who reported 
that, when he had asked this "knave" to come and see him, and offered him a drink 
of wine or beer to congratulate him on his appointment, the new TumSnggung had 
actually refused, and said that his predecessor had been too fond of this "Dutch 
custom." 77
Greeve decided to write to the Sunan, warning him of the dangers of having 
such evil advisers and asking him to arrest them as a sign of his trust and friend­
ship with the Company. He had had no doubt that this request would be fulfilled, 
and was therefore dumbfounded when the Sunan refused, saying that Greeve should 
not listen to evil rumors. He himself would guarantee the advisers: surely the Com­
pany trusted his word? After the promotion of Raden Santri, Greeve noted that 
the whole principality was virtually in the hands of this man, as the Surakarta 
Patih was only a "foolish creature." He also noted that the Sunan was technically 
within his rights in making these replacements since, according to the contracts 
with the V .O .C ., only the appointment of a patih required both parties' approval.
It may be that he was at this stage deliberately using his untrammeled rights over 
other appointments to isolate the Patih, and deprive him of all power of action.
In reporting the promotion of Raden Santri, Hartsinck echoes the words used by 
the diarist; the Sunan had said that he would now see whether the man was good 
or bad.
75. 208R-209L.
76. See Greeve to Batavia, August 3, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
77. See Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
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Greeve was also greatly shocked by Hartsinck's nocturnal visit to the kraton: 
he spent some effort in enquiring from the other European office-holders in Sura­
karta just exactly what Hartsinck had been wearing (bSbSd or long trousers?).
In either case, the visit was a disgraceful departure from the proper ceremony 
which should attend a Resident's visit to a Sunan. Furthermore, stylistic changes 
in the Javanese of the Sunan's letters seemed to provide evidence that Hartsinck 
himself had had a hand—for whatever reason—in the composition of recent letters 
to Greeve.78 79
It is striking that the evidence both of the diary and of Greeve's informants 
indicates that Pakubuwana IV was taking a pro-Islamic and anti-European direc­
tion: attending the mosque and reading the kutbah79 (as his brothers Pangeran 
Pamot and Pangeran Arya Mataram—later Mangkubumi—also did on some occasions), 
instructing his men to perform their prayers properly, 80 sending a party to inspect 
the DSmak mosque with a view of building a replica,81 forbidding alcohol and opi­
um,82 replacing European clothes with Javanese or Middle Eastern styles,83 84and 
reportedly planning to attack the Europeans in residence. It is also striking that 
MangkunSgara's dream bracketed together not only the Dutch and their chief ally 
at Surakarta, Pangeran Purbaya, but also the Chinese—half a century after the 
"Chinese war" in which the young Mangkunggara had taken the side of the pro- 
Chinese party against the V.O.C. His sentiments of this period, bracketing the 
Dutch and Chinese together as allies, point forward to the Java War.
From about this time relations between Sala and Yogyakarta begin to command 
significantly more of the diarist’s attention. On the first day of 1716 AJ [Septem­
ber 21, 1789] TumSnggung Mangkuyuda and TumSnggung Kanduruhan were sent 
out with an armed force to Kabaderan, where the kStib had reported the presence 
of rebels (sixteen men and one woman) from Putat, under the jurisdiction of Mata­
ram. She comments that these rebels (who were in the event seized by villagers 
while the two TumSnggung and their men sheltered from the rain) were directed 
by the "Yogyakarta people" (that is, by the kraton and, ultimately, by the Sultan). 
When she later reports that the kumpSni had handed them over to the Sultan and 
that as a result two of his punggawa were exiled to Ceylon, she says that this was 
just by way of being an offering to remove shame from the Sultan himself ( tutup 
lingsSm ing galih /  rSsik kakalih kang punggawa /  kangjSng sultan /  dadiya baban-  
ten ngisin) . Two days after the apprehension of these rebels, two of MangkunS­
gara's lurah seized another "Mataram spy," chained him up and mishandled him.
The Company intervened, and asked that the man be handed over to them, which 
was done. The MangkunSgaran maintained face, however: the diarist comments 
that "the Pangeran Adipati did not intend to put to death this man, whose crime 
merited it. " 8I>
78. See Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
79. For example, 218L, 239R (the inauguration of the new mosque by the Sunan), 
and 240L.
80. 199R.
81. Greeve to Batavia, September 30, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790; see also, diary 
233-39.
82. 187L.
83. For example, 199R, 240L, 247L.
84. 211L-212R.
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A few weeks later, the ringleaders among the Kabaderan rebels, including the 
woman (named "Sontrang"), were publicly executed in the presence of the Sunan 
and the Resident.
The locus of this rebellion, which is described in Greeve's letter to Batavia of 
October 24, 1789,85 86was the PSngging area northwest of Surakarta. Since those 
involved seemed to be the Sultan's subjects—the "Putat" mentioned by the diarist 
is presumably the village of that name in the Grobogan region—they were handed 
over to him. He subsequently gave them back to Surakarta, saying that they had 
only resided in his territory for a short time. The Sultan said he had made an in­
quiry into the matter which had found that those concerned were simple-minded. 
Believing their "rebellion" to be blessed with supernatural help, they had marched 
through the countryside singing and making no attempt to conceal their presence. 
The Sunan took the matter more seriously, however, since their aim had apparently 
been to take his kraton.
The Sultan did exile some members of his court at about this time: the son and 
four grandsons of his dead younger brother, Pangeran Mangkukusuma. In a letter 
of 12 Sura 1716 AJ (October 2, 1789 A D ),88 he notified the V.O.C. that he was 
exiling them for their "bad behavior" and the insecurity they had caused in the 
city; no mention is made of an incursion into Surakarta territory. It may be that 
the diarist, as a loyal member of the MangkunSgaran household, blamed every dis­
turbance on the Sultan; it is equally possible that the Sultan was in fact trying to 
conceal his support of this incursion and attempting to make it appear the spon­
taneous inspiration of a few simple-minded people.
There seems to be no record in the letters of this period of any other "Mata- 
ram spy" being captured by MangkunSgara's men and subsequently handed over 
to the Dutch factory.
Over this period the atmosphere in Surakarta must have been unusually 
charged: the Sunan continued to sack and replace his officials, 87 publicly execut­
ing thieves and rebels. He also held unusually frequent tiger-buffalo fights, 
which were attended by both Dutch functionaries and his own men, dressed like 
haji in turbans and jubah. 88 In general, he gave the Company officials evidence 
that he was "a different man from his father," an observation which, says the 
diarist, they reported to SSmarang, but otherwise kept to themselves. 89 Both 
MangkunSgara and the Sunan were increasing their armed forces. 90
It was also a time when the fate o f the Company's chief representative in Sura­
karta was being decided. The diarist records that on 21 Sapar 1716 [November 10, 
1789] Resident Hartsinck, returning from SSmarang, came to tell MangkunSgara 
that he was to be dismissed and replaced by the Company's Second Resident 
("Petor") at TSgal, who was the [Governor-] General's son-in-law. 91 Then in
85. See KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
86. Enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, October 12, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
87. 213.
88. 217R, 231R, 238, 239R.
89. 227R.
90. 216, 228R, 238L, 240R (here Pakubuwana orders his wadana and mantri to arm 
their men and to provide horses), 243R.
91. 216R-217L. The diarist consistently uses the word "Petor" to denote Second 
Residents.
86
early December the TumSnggung o f Banyumas, Pangeran Ary a Mataram, and Pange- 
ran Rangga went to Hartsinck with [unspecified and by implication unjustified] 
accusations against MangkunSgara, who was leading a peaceful existence in accor­
dance with his undertaking to the Company. The diarist claims that the evil genius 
behind these accusations was the now widowed mother o f the TumSnggung of Ban­
yumas, whose animus against MangkunSgara dated back to the period when, her 
husband still alive, she had been having an affair with another man o f high posi­
tion, TumSnggung CakranSgara. The diarist also claims that, when Pakubuwana 
III had dismissed her husband from his appointment, he had also given the order 
that she, as a "whore-mouth" and a "queen of devils," should be put to death.
But she was reprieved, and her son succeeded to the Banyumas appointment, so 
that she continued to make trouble with gossip and slander. Finally, the diarist 
claims that Hartsinck had formed an alliance with this clique in order to be kept on 
in his post as Resident, and had promised Pangeran Rangga 500 real if this were 
to happen. 92
Greeve had now reported Hartsinck's unsatisfactory performance of his duties 
to the Governor-General and Council, and on November 6 received their decision to 
dismiss Hartsinck from his post. Greeve did in fact then suggest that Hartsinck 
be replaced by the (First, not Second) Resident of TSgal, J. L. Umbgrove, who 
was the son-in-law of Governor-General Alting, as the diarist states. Alting did 
not, however, accept Greeve's suggestion—perhaps he already had Umbgrove in 
mind for the lucrative Residency of Cirebon to which he was appointed the follow­
ing year, and where Alting liked to have a member of his family.93 94 It was not un­
til April 12, 1790 that Greeve received notice that J. Fr. Baron van Reede tot de 
Parkeler (then head of the V .O .C .'s  Japan factory but with previous experience 
in Java) had been nominated as First Resident of Surakarta. In the meantime 
Hartsinck, who had asked to remain on in the city until he could wind up his 
affairs, was granted permission to stay on until August 1790,99 and did not ac­
tually leave until September 4. 95
The TumSnggung ( i . e . , Bupati) of Banyumas, whose widow plays so prominent 
a part in the slander campaign reported by the diarist, was YudanSgara. Pakubu­
wana III had dismissed him in 1780 because of a secret overland mission to BantSn 
he had made apparently for the Sultan of Yogyakarta, to whom his father (Danu- 
reja I) was Patih.96 Reports from 1772 allege that MangkunSgara had some sort of 
conspiratorial relationship with YudanSgara at that time,97 and the evident personal 
enmity between the Prince and YudanSgara's unfaithful wife would be understand­
able in such a context. It seems that her slanders had little effect, probably 
because MangkunSgara was then well placed with the Sunan, and Hartsinck was 
no longer in a position to do him harm with the V.O.C.
Even more interesting perhaps is the diarist's allegation that Hartsinck was 
involved with a court faction and had offered to pay Pangeran Rangga 500 real if 
he were continued in his post as Resident. At first sight, it seems unlikely that a
92. 223R-224L.
93. See Frederik de Haan, Priangan, 4 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1910-12), 3, 
§ 1839.
94. Greeve to Batavia, December 5, 1789, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
95. Greeve to Batavia, September 7, 1790, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
96. See Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 229-30.
97. Ib id ., p. 146.
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Dutch Resident would rely on a faction of the Javanese aristocracy to forward his 
career. Yet Hartsinck's behavior up to this point had been so strange as to war­
rant his removal: he had delayed reporting any news of the Sunan's suspicious 
activities until Greeve heard about these from an unofficial source; he had denied 
that Wilatikta was a "pope" or that his appointment betokened anything out of the 
way, though Greeve had heard, again from a source other than Hartsinck, that 
Wilatikta had openly spoken against Dutch ways; and it appears that he had even 
been helping the Sunan to compose his correspondence to the Company (not to 
speak of making nocturnal visits to the kraton in Javanese dress). All these 
things point to Hartsinck's serving two masters to advance his own affairs, so that 
the diarist's claim that he had offered 500 real to secure his position is not so fan­
tastic. The most probable reconstruction of the sequence of events to this point 
is as follows: the Sunan, in his moves to replace the officials of his father's reign 
with his own appointees and in general to strengthen his own position, had mobi­
lized his troops, and taken the additional precaution of buying off the V .O.C. 
Resident. Susceptibility to money bribes was not unknown among Residents, even 
after the demise of the V .O .C ., with its notoriously "corrupt" officialdom. We 
find later cases, such as that of the Surakarta Resident Rijck van Prehn, who was 
dismissed in 1820 after receiving 2,000 real for his complaisance in the appointment 
of Secawikrama as Patih, 6,000 real for a similar attitude in the appointment of 
Pangeran PurbanSgara as Bupati of KSdiri, and in all a total of 14,500 real in such 
payments.98 It would seem that, when Greeve announced to Hartsinck that he was 
going to be replaced as Resident, the direction of the money-flow was reversed,as 
Hartsinck attempted to induce his associates to guarantee his continuation in his 
appointment. The obvious question is why he should think that these Javanese 
associates would be able to exert any influence on V.O .C. decisions. The answer 
may be found in Greeve's attitude. The Governor had been very shocked at the 
revelation—after Palm's unexpected death—of the amount of offense Hartsinck's 
predecessor had given the Surakarta aristocracy over a whole range of matters.99 
Greeve had then actually taken the trouble to write a memorandum to Hartsinck,100 
when he took up his new appointment, instructing him to achieve a position of in­
fluence with the Sunan, the Crown Prince, and MangkunSgara, by winning their 
trust with friendly treatment. Hartsinck had certainly done so, and may have 
hoped that the amicable, complaisant relationship he had established with the aris­
tocracy would be all he needed to ensure the V .O .C .'s blessing for his continuance 
in office: and why not pick the fruits of this amicable connection?
The Company had, then, been represented by two very different, but equally 
dangerous, representatives in Surakarta. The first, Palm, had thought he could 
bully the Javanese aristocracy into acting as his lackeys and provisioners and had 
thoroughly offended them by his contemptuous breaches of established procedure. 
The second, Hartsinck, seems to have accepted the role of a passive accomplice 
and made himself comfortable in this, abandoning the vigilance, faithful reporting, 
and subtle manipulation of the political balance which the V.O.C. required from 
men in his position. There is no doubt that the significant blank areas in Hart­
sinck's reporting contributed significantly to the developing crisis.
98. On the van Prehn case, see G. P. Rouffaer's preface to J. W. Winter's 
"Beknopte beschrijving van het hof Soerakarta in 1824," Btjdragen tot de taal-, 
land- en volkenkunde (henceforth BKI) , 54 (1902), pp. 17 ff.
99. See above, pp. 71-74.
100. Appended to Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, enclosure no. 11, in KA 3708, 
VOCOB, 1789.
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Passages of A rms
On 22 Arwah 1716 AJ [May 7, 1790] the Sunan proclaimed at a public audience 
that he had bestowed names and titles on two o f his brothers: Pangeran Ary a Mata- 
ram was henceforth to be known as Pangeran Mangkubumi, and Raden Mas Saidi 
was to be known as Pangeran Buminata. A few weeks later, on 14 Siyam [May 28] 
he sent TumSnggung Kanduruhan Wilatikta on a secret journey into Yogyakarta 
territory. The diarist does not record what force of men accompanied him, but 
says that he suffered a tactical defeat by the Mataram soldiery to the considerable 
shame of the Sunan, who did not appear at the Saturday tournament for two 
weeks. 101
On 28 Siyam, the Sunan received a letter from the "D&ler SSmarang" [the 
Governor, Greeve] asking him to replace the title "Pangeran Mangkubumi" with 
"Pangeran PugSr." The diarist explains that the Sultan was greatly angered by 
Sala's disparaging appropriation o f his names: there was not only a "Pangeran 
Mangkubumi" but also a "TumSnggung Sujanapura, " and the Sultan as a boy had 
been called Raden Mas Sujana.
The Sunan hesitated, but eventually stood firm. Then on 20 BSsar [August 31, 
1790], the same day that the new Resident [J. F. Baron van Reede tot de Parke- 
ler] was installed, the diarist records the first news of raiding parties from Mata­
ram causing serious damage. Neither MangkunSgara nor the Sunan reacted imme­
diately: the diarist explains that they were waiting to see what the Company did.
Greeve received the news, "as unexpected as unpleasant," of the Sunan's be­
stowal of the contentious name Mangkubumi, in a brief letter from Hartsinck of 
May 6.102 He was immediately anxious about the probable repercussions in Mataram.
The "secret expedition" under Kanduruhan Wilatikta was not reported to 
Greeve: it is impossible to tell whether Hartsinck knew anything of it. However, 
the evidence of the diary that the Sunan was beginning to take an aggressive atti­
tude to Mataram (and the giving of this name cannot, in the Javanese context, 
have been intended as anything less than a calculated insult) is strengthened by 
the fact that Greeve received letters from MangkunSgara claiming that van Straalen- 
dorff (First Resident of Surakarta 1767-84) had promised him on two occasions that 
he would be given the throne of Mataram on the Sultan's death. It seems clear 
that MangkunSgara knew that something was in the wind, and was endeavoring to 
find out what profit he could expect if he remained on the Company's side instead 
of joining the Sunan in his planned agression against Mataram.
MangkunSgara claimed that van Straalendorff had made this promise to him in 
the name of the "Edelheer at SSmarang" (the Governor of the northeast coast) on 
2 Jumadilakir 1700 AJ and again on 26 Sapar Je 1710 AJ.103 The first date falls
101. 240R-241L: dina saptu prabu taruna ing sala /  datan miyos tinangkil /  datan 
miyos watang /  siyam ta[ng]gral lima las /  wagugSn tyase narpati /  lingsSme driya /  
kang dadya lilingsSmi II lampahira kanduruwan wilatikta /  lampahe nyalawadi /  
mundur kawon jangkah /  lan bala ing mataram /  kulewesan mundur mulih /  pun 
kanduruwan /  marang sala nagari / /  mila lingsSm taruna praba ing sala /  wadana 
mundur mulih . . .
102. See Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
103. See enclosures 10 and 11, MangkunSgara to Greeve, received at SSmarang on 
May 15 and 17 respectively, in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 
1791.
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outside the period covered by the diary, but under the second date the diarist has 
in fact entered a note recording just such a promise (see above, p. 68). This 
indicates that Mangkunggara genuinely believed he had been given such an under­
taking. Further, it is not at all improbable that van Straalendorff had at least 
hinted at such a possibility: the Company was very prone to the use of threats or 
bribes with Javanese princes and, as de Jonge has remarked,10lf frequently did not 
keep its word. This was, indeed, a technique which Greeve himself was to use 
later with Pakubuwana IV .104 05 Not surprisingly, the disillusionment he underwent 
sometimes led the prince concerned to become embittered towards the V.O .C. and 
even on occasion to become dishonest in his own behavior.
Greeve was alarmed to hear of Mangkunggara's claims on Yogyakarta. He post­
poned giving Mangkunggara an answer while he made enquiries about the military 
situation. These revealed that Mangkunggara had at least 500 men in his house­
hold, on wages, and could easily summon another three to four thousand. His in­
formant remarked that Mangkunggara was popular among his men—"criminal 
wretches" as many of them were—because of his former leadership in war and be­
cause of the good treatment and protection which he always gave them. The Com­
pany's military reserves, in contrast, numbered exactly 243. 106 Greeve himself 
was of the opinion that Mangkunggara could in fact call up as many as 10,000 men 
within three days.
In his letter of June 11,107 Greeve, who was then trying to persuade the Sunan 
to change the offending name to "Puggr," reported that there had been no military 
movements so far ( the diarist's evidence suggests that minor skirmishes were al­
ready taking place), although he had received a report that the Sunan and Mang­
kunggara had formed a contingency plan for the eventuality of the Sultan's death. 
This would involve blocking passage for the Company's troops to Yogyakarta. 
Greeve did not believe this information, although he did request military reinforce­
ments and tried to arrange for the Sultan's abdication in favor of the Crown Prince, 
under Company auspices. By June 24, it was clear that the Sultan would not agree 
to this,108 and was, moreover, extremely annoyed because Mangkunggara's grand­
son Prang Wadana was reputedly giving shelter to Yogyakarta highway robbers.
Van Ijsseldijk reported that he had had the greatest difficulty in preventing the 
Sultan from seeking justice himself.109 Mangkunggara denied that his people were 
supporting these robbers, although he said that he had formed three complete com­
panies of prajurit from Yogyakarta refugees.110 Through June and July Greeve 
and the Sunan continued to argue their respective positions about the contentious 
name: Greeve claimed that "Puggr" was a more prestigious name and could be ac­
cepted without humiliation as a mark of the special favor of the Sunan and the 
V .O .C .; the prince who was to be so distinguished then himself claimed that he 
did not have sufficient lands and men to live up to such a high title; the Sunan
104. J. K. J. de Jonge, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indie 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1878), 10, p. LXXIII.
105. See below, p. 98.
106. See F. J. Rothenbuhler to Greeve, May 16, in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in 
KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
107. KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
108. On the Sultan's reaction, see Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 322-23.
109. See Greeve to Batavia, June 24, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
110. See Mangkunggara to Greeve, June 25, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
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agreed to add Greeve's "PugSr" to his brother's name, but not to withdraw the pre­
viously bestowed "Mangkubumi," saying that he could not go back on what he had 
publicly confirmed. He said that the Sultan, who, after all, no longer used the 
name "Mangkubumi," was behaving very wrongly in relaying threats to him via the 
Company,instead of addressing him in a friendly way as a fellow ruler; and that he 
did not intend to be misused as his father had been in 1788 (that is, on the occa­
sion of the bestowal of the same contentious name on MangkunSgara’s grandson and 
its subsequent withdrawal because of pressure from the Company).111
Greeve's attitude towards the Sultan was very ambiguous. On the one hand, 
having received reports that four to five thousand soldiers were being paraded in 
Yogyakarta,112 the Governor was fearful of aggression from the Sultan, and there­
fore reproached him for his belligerent stance. On the other hand, he felt that it 
was necessary to ensure the Sultan's military cooperation in the event of an attempt 
by Mangkunegara to conquer Mataram.113 14 Van Ijsseldijk reported that the Sultan 
had declined to give precise information about the size of the military force avail­
able to him, merely saying that he had "enough" men; and that he had broken off 
all correspondence with Surakarta.111* Greeve later estimated that the Sultan's 
forces would total about 7,000 men, the same as those of the Sunan.115
Greeve was gathering together as many troops as the various stations of the 
V .O .C . could spare: he detained about 120 on their way from east Java to Ceylon,116 
and a further forty-five men and three officers arrived in SSmarang by ship a little 
later.117 He then received 119 Wiirttemberger troops from the Cape garrison and 
250 troops from Batavia. But high mortality and sickness ate into these numbers, 
so that Greeve found it necessary to detain another fifty troops bound for Malacca.118
By August 6, minor skirmishes were reported between the Sultan's and Sunan's 
men, causing the deaths of a few combatants on either side. By the end of the month 
Greeve had managed to strengthen each of the central Javanese garrisons by a hun­
dred men and now asked permission to use [another] fifty men who had been bound 
for Malacca, ninety-six sepoys who had arrived from Makassar under their own offi­
cers, as well as one or two companies of Wiirttembergers.119 Feeling that the mili­
tary situation was now sufficiently in the Company's favor, he at last passed on to 
MangkunSgara the letter containing the Governor-General's statement of June 11 to 
the effect that he, Mangkun&gara, had no hope of succeeding to the Yogyakarta 
Sultanate. Greeve had long feared what the reaction to this letter might be.
In the event, however, MangkunSgara took this disappointment without public 
protest, writing politely to Greeve that he would always follow the Company's
111. See above, pp. 75-76.
112. See Greeve to Batavia, July 3, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
113. Greeve to Batavia, July 29, and Greeve to the Sultan, July 22, in KA 3802, 
VOCOB, 1791.
114. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, July 27, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
115. See Greeve's diary, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792, sub November 5.
116. Greeve to Batavia, June 26, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
117. Greeve to Batavia, July 3, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
118. Greeve to Batavia, July 29, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
119. See Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
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commands.120 Greeve was beginning to have a hopeful view of the prospect of pre­
serving the peace (at least for the time being) when this was dispelled by the news 
that the Sultan’s troops had attacked villages of both MangkunSgara and the Sunan, 
the former on account of MangkunSgara's pretensions to the Yogyakarta throne, 
and the latter on account of the insult offered by the bestowal of the name Mangku- 
bumi. The Sultan and the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta claimed that they for their 
part had suffered a number of attacks by the MangkunSgaran: that MangkunSgara's 
grandson by marriage, Jayawinata, had plundered a Yogya village and burnt and 
robbed a Chinese tollgate; and that his son Suryakusuma had plundered the Sul­
tan's mancanagara subjects on their way to Yogya with their yearly offerings of 
produce. 121
Greeve not only told van Ijsseldijk to expostulate with the Sultan over these 
attacks, but also decided to withhold the moneys paid to him for the coastal tolls, 
usually collected at the beginning of September and the major source of monetary 
income for the Javanese riders. A few days later, however, he decided to let the 
Sultan have the money after all, in order, he said, not to seem to be favoring the 
Sunan.122
The new Surakarta Resident, van Reede, reported that MangkunSgara was not 
returning these Yogyakarta attacks, saying that, even if the Mataram soldiers 
appeared before his very dal&m, he would sit still and do nothing without orders 
from the Sunan and the Company. Later, however, van Reede received news that 
iMangkunSgara's men had, in fact, devastated a village in the Bayalali area, though 
MangkunSgara himself denied knowledge of this,123 124and it seems that his grandson 
Prang Wadana was responsible.121*
Van Ijsseldijk suggested at this juncture that MangkunSgara and his family 
should swear an oath to live in peace with Mataram. The Sultan subsequently 
agreed to withdraw his troops from the field if this were done, but refused to re­
open relations with Surakarta until the name was retracted. The Sunan said that 
he had no men in thS field except a few under his brother Mangkubumi whom he 
had sent out to defend his villagers, and would now withdraw. MangkunSgara 
also said that he had only defensive postings, and asked the Company either to 
bring about a real and lasting peace or to allow him to take his revenge. The 
Surakarta side also asked for compensation for the devastation caused.125
On September 9, van Ijsseldijk reported to Greeve that MangkunSgara's men 
had actually murdered the Sultan's nephew, Raden Sumadikara, and brought his 
head to Surakarta, and had taken prisoner a brother-in-law of the Yogyakarta 
Crown Prince. The Sultan was furious, and only the "courageous action" of the
120. MangkunSgara to Greeve, August 29, in Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in 
KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
121. See letter of van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, September 3, and letter of the Yogya­
karta Patih DanurSja to Resident van Ijsseldijk, in Greeve to Batavia, September 4, 
in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
122. Greeve to Batavia, September 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
123. See van Reede to Greeve, September 4 and 6, in Greeve to Batavia, Septem­
ber 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
124. See Greeve to Batavia, September 9, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
125. Ibid.
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Patih, who threatened to resign, prevented him from taking revenge.126 Finally 
(and reluctantly) Greeve decided he had to intervene in person. He left SSmarang 
on September 15 with an escort of dragoons; a further 374 men awaited the arrival 
of porters.127 This step was partly motivated by a letter he had received from the 
Sunan suggesting that, since there were likely to be many pretenders to the Sul­
tan's throne after his death, trouble could be avoided by dividing Yogyakarta 
among his children. Greeve felt this proposal would destroy the necessary equi­
poise between the two kingdoms, which was the foundation of the Company's mas­
tery of Java, and that it was probably a cover for the Sunan's plan to swallow the 
fragments of Mataram one by one.
As remarked above, the diarist notes that the Sunan and MangkunSgara were 
concerned to see how the Company would react, and on the first day of the new 
year, 1717 [September 11, 1790 AD], the Sunan himself called on MangkunSgara 
to discuss the situation, an unprecedented departure from normal protocol. Ac­
cording to the diarist, he left it to MangkunSgara to say whether he would stand 
firm against the Company, and MangkunSgara agreed to do s o .128 Afterwards, he 
discussed the matter with his sons, and a few days later Governor Greeve arrived 
from SSmarang. 129 By now, MangkunSgara's dSmang were bringing in heads of 
fallen Yogyakarta warriors.130 On 11 Sura [September 21, 1790] a deputation from 
Yogya—the Patih DanurSja and two TumSnggung—was brought by the Dutch 
Resident to Sala to speak with the Sunan, who, according to the diarist, addressed 
them with open insults, bringing Greeve to the point of tears. MangkunSgara him­
self bought up large stocks o f rice, readied his army, and sent Pangeran Prang 
Wadana to consult with the Sunan.131
Greeve tried to give MangkunSgara a letter from the Sultan, but the prince 
refused to receive it. 132 He went to see the Sunan, who remained unbending, and 
advised him not to try to apply pressure on his "uncle," who was a man not to be 
frightened once he had made up his mind—in fact, he might actually stab Greeve. 
The diarist then notes that Greeve decided not to visit MangkunSgara after all, 
and went instead to the Patih's house. Now 300 south Indians in the Company's 
service arrived in Sala from SSmarang;133 the Residents of Surakarta and Yogya­
karta and Greeve continued to try to intimidate MangkunSgara, in vain. The two 
Patih—Jayaningrat of Sala and DanurSja of Yogyakarta—swore an oath in the Dutch 
factory. This was on 18 Sura 1717 [September 28, 1790].
126. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, September 9, in Greeve to Batavia, September 
11, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
127. See Greeve's diary, September 15, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
128. 249R: susunan sala apasrah /  mring pangeran adipati /  sakatahe padamSlan /  
kSncSng panggah mring kump[e]ni / pangeran adipati / panggah tan ISngganeng 
kayun /  karsane putra nata /  tumurut panggah ing kardi . . .
129. 251L.
130. 252L.
131. 253L.
132. 253R-254L, 15 Sura 1717 [September 25, 1790].
133. The diarist notes that they were "unbelievers" who looked like [Middle- 
Eastern] Muslim traders (koja), and were paid the same as Dutch troops, adding 
that the Governor [Greeve] hoped that they would terrify the Javanese into obe­
dience. There was a significant proportion of sepoys among the V.O.C. troops: 
see above, p. 90.
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The Company had decided to offer MangkunSgara 4,000 real per annum, but 
he refused: only 4,000 cacah would do. He also asked for the return of his wife 
and sSlir.13h Greeve refused this last request, but promised to try to get the 
cacah.
Greeve's diary (in KA 3833) gives the following account of the events between 
September 15 and the swearing of the oath by the two Patih: on the vexed ques­
tion of the name, he made the surprising discovery that before bestowing it, the 
Sunan, mindful of Yogyakarta's reaction in 1788, had actually discussed the matter 
with Hartsinck, who had allegedly told him that he was perfectly within his rights 
to call his brother "Mangkubumi." Greeve summoned Hartsinck back from SSma- 
rang to Surakarta (which he had left only on September 4) and extracted from him 
a confession of his responsibility in the affair, which was then sent on to the Sul­
tan. Greeve told the Sunan that, since Hartsinck had given him the Company's 
permission, however wrongly, the Company would not now ask him to withdraw the 
name Mangkubumi. On September 21 a Yogyakarta party arrived and asked if the 
Company would agree to the Sultan's bestowing the name "Mangkubumi" on his own 
grandson, the son of the Crown Prince, by way of compensation for its use in Sura­
karta.134 35 This solution having proved acceptable to all sides, the matter of the 
name was no longer an issue.
The quarrel between MangkunSgara and the Sultan was, however, not so easily 
resolved. Both sides claimed that the other had been the first to attack. Greeve 
proposed a peace plan, evidently based on van Ijsseldijk's earlier suggestion, by 
which all parties would sign a Contract of Reconciliation ( Contract van Bevreedi- 
ging). The Yogyakarta reaction to this suggestion was much more favorable than 
Greeve had hoped, but MangkunSgara continued to insist that the only acceptable 
token of the Sultan's peaceable intentions would be the return of Ratu Bendara and 
his two sSlir. This was clearly an impossible demand and could only signify that 
MangkunSgara meant to obstruct the road to peace. On the 26th of September, 
however, MangkunSgara sent his European equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, 
to tell Greeve that his children, Pangeran PurbanSgara and Pangeran PadmanSgara, 
were pressing him to adhere to the Sunan's counsel, so that he was not able to 
oblige Greeve in what he had requested. Greeve also received reports that the 
MangkunSgaran forces were continuing their attacks.
Moreover, the Sunan's behavior still presented difficulties, even after the 
"Mangkubumi" issue was resolved. On the one hand, he proposed that he should 
marry one of the daughters of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince and, when Greeve later 
went to Yogyakarta,asked him to select for him the most beautiful of the princesses. 
On the other hand, he put a long series of procedural difficulties in the way of the 
Contract of Reconciliation. Although Greeve's diary does not record that the Su­
nan verbally abused the Yogyakarta party (as described in the MangkunSgaran 
diary), he does record that the Sunan unduly delayed sending his Patih on a 
reciprocal visit to Yogyakarta.
134. The wife referred to was Ratu BSndara, daughter of the Sultan of Yogyakarta 
who had now been back with her father for twenty-seven years. See above, p. 73. 
Two of MangkunSgara's sSlir had defected to Mataram and had apparently joined 
the Crown Prince's household: see below.
135. This bears out the point made above (p. 76) that, though the Sultan may 
have claimed categorically that "no two people can have the same name," in practice 
a more flexible approach was adopted. The solution of this particular case, invoking 
as it did a counter-principle (perhaps new) of parity between the two courts, 
apparently allowed Yogyakarta to feel that honor was satisfied.
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After the Patih of Yogyakarta and of Surakarta had finally put their seals on 
the Contract on September 28, Greeve told MangkunSgara that he too must put his 
seal on it, on the following day. MangkunSgara continued,however,to insist on the 
return of his wife and sSlir, and his equerry Bloemhart told Greeve that Mangku­
nSgara had had a conference with his sons and his grandson Prang Wadana. Later 
in the day, MangkunSgara told Greeve that, if he were compelled to renounce his 
wife and sSlir, the Company should do something to compensate him, as it had so 
often said that he was under its protection, and he had put up with so much bitter­
ness in its name. He asked for 4,000 cacah; Greeve offered 4,000 real per annum, 
but MangkunSgara said that he could not "sell his wife for money." He also told 
Greeve that it was the Sunan who was forcing him to be intransigent; and Greeve 
himself knew that five of MangkunSgara's sons held appointments from the Sunan, 
and could lose these if the Sunan were alienated. At the same time, Greeve was 
receiving information, via the V .O .C .'s chief ally, Pangeran Purbaya, that "seri­
ous things" were happening in the kraton, and he should be on his guard. The 
Sunan's generally uncooperative behavior gave added credence to these rumors, 
as he refused to put his seal on MangkunSgara's request to the Sultan of Yogya­
karta to provide the 4,000 cacah, and was also unwilling to pay for the upkeep of 
the V .O .C .'s  military reinforcements, saying that he had given Greeve no occa­
sion to bring such a large force.136 Two days later,137 the Sunan sent a letter to 
Greeve with a fresh request, that is, that the pSngulu of SSmarang and of Yogya­
karta should be obliged to obtain the approval of the Surakarta pSngulu for mar­
riages they contracted. Greeve postponed answering this letter until peace had 
been fully restored.
The Mataram raids continued; MangkunSgara's dSmang and a large force under 
Pangeran Prang Wadana pushed the invaders back, conquered some Yogyakarta 
villages, and took the heads o f four men of rank (Raden). Greeve ordered the 
fighting to be stopped, and the MangkunSgaran forces obeyed. The diarist ex ­
plains that this was done for two reasons: first, Greeve had undertaken to get the
4,000 cacah; and second, the Yogyakarta forces had Dutchmen with them. She 
also says that Pangeran Prang Wadana was extremely exasperated by this stop to 
the fighting, and had to be calmed by his father. The MangkunSgaran troops too 
were disappointed and did not like to retreat before the "kumpSni's" pressure. 138
On October 1, Prang Wadana, who had been absent from Surakarta for four 
days, returned home on his grandfather's orders. On the 3rd of the month, how­
ever, it was reported that Prang Wadana was still attacking the Sultan's people in 
Pajang and Gunung Kidul. Greeve decided to send Dutch officers from the Sura­
karta and Yogyakarta garrisons out to these areas to see what was happening.
However, Greeve returned from Yogyakarta unsuccessful: he had not per­
suaded the Sultan to allocate 4,000 of his cacah to MangkunSgara. 139 140 The prince 
refused to accept money, and Greeve, having annoyed the Sunan too (by pretend­
ing to be ill and causing a kraton party to be cancelled), left in humiliating disarray 
for SSmarang, llf0
136. See Greeve's diary, under October 1, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
137. According to Ricklefs (Jogjakarta, p. 330), Greeve did not learn of this re­
quest until October 11. It is, however, found in the diary entry for October 3.
138. 256R.
139. 257.
140. 258; see also Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 329-30.
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In Yogyakarta11*1 Greeve had indeed been unsuccessful in obtaining the 4,000 
cacah. The Sultan would not even speak of Ratu BSndara; the sSlir could not be 
returned because they had borne the Crown Prince's children. He asked Greeve 
to intervene on his behalf and rescue one of his regents from MangkunSgara's men. 
It appears that, at this stage, MangkunSgara's men had captured considerably 
more of the Sultan's villages than the Sultan's men had of his, so that the military 
advantage was with the MangkunSgara.
It was officially settled that the name "Mangkubumi" would be given to the Sul­
tan's grandson Pangeran Anora; and that the setting of the Sultan's and Sunan's 
seals on the Contract of Reconciliation should also take place. The Sultan agreed 
to ask the Crown Prince to add his seal to the Contract, as MangkunSgara had re­
quested .
Back in Surakarta, Greeve reported to the Sunan that, although he had in fact 
seen the Crown Prince's daughters en d&shabilli, he could not give a good descrip­
tion of their appeal to the eye. The Sunan repeated his request for recognition 
of the primacy of the Surakarta pSngulu, adding that he wished to be recognized 
as the "first prince" on Java. Greeve reported to MangkunSgara his failure to ob­
tain the 4,000 cacah, and the prince once again refused to accept the 4,000 real, 
saying that this would not compensate for the shame he had suffered.
Greeve excused himself from the reception planned by the Sunan because he 
feared that it was to be the scene of treachery against the Company,11*2 and re­
turned to SSmarang. He left the Resident, van Reede, to arrange for the Sunan 
to put his seal on the Contract.
As soon as Greeve left, MangkunSgara created new corps o f soldiery—from 
volunteers, including some santri, who pressed their services upon him—and these 
went out to fight the Yogya forces at Jimbung and MatSsih on 8 Sapor 1717 [Octo­
ber 18, 1790]. This time, however, they had to retreat before the Yogyakarta 
forces. The diarist explains that this was because the Sultan's men had Dutchmen 
with them, and because the Sunan did not keep his promise to support the Mang- 
kunSgaran forces. The prince himself did not take part "because he had boils. "11*3
News of further attacks by MangkunSgara's men, in the Gunung Kidul region, 
came as early as October 13, the day Greeve left Surakarta. Now that he himself 
was safely back in SSmarang, Greeve instructed van Reede to tell the Sunan that 
the Company knew of his underhand support for MangkunSgara, and also wrote 
to the Yogyakarta Resident instructing him to take an equally firm stance and warn 
the Sultan not to resort to force. Greeve continued to strengthen his military 
backing. Batavia had been unable to supply more troops but had authorized him 
to hire Madurese,1**1* and he had asked for 500 from west Madura and 300 from 
SumSnSp. He was also assembling in SSmarang the regents from the pasisir, who 
were directly under the V .O .C ., with their armed men. There were about 1,500 
of these troops by October 27 and half of them were to remain in SSmarang, to­
gether with the Pangeran of Madura and of SumSnSp with their personal soldiery 
(numbering 1,500), until the total force of 1,600 they had offered to Greeve had 1423
141. On Greeve's visit to Yogyakarta, see Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 328.
142. See ibid., p. 329,on this episode.
143. 260L. dasar karingSn (= korengSn) gSrahe.
144. The V.O .C. advanced Greeve large sums of money—over 100,000 rijksdaal- 
ders—for hiring these troops. See Greeve to Batavia, November 8, in KA 3833, 
VOCOB, 1792.
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been assembled. Finally, Greeve was also able to obtain assistance from the crew 
(not numerous) of three ships under the command of Staringh, which were to have 
been repaired at Batavia.11*8 On October 25, Greeve received news that the Sul­
tan’s men had retaken all their Gunung Kidul villages from MangkunSgara.
On 23 Sapar [November 2, 1790] MangkunSgara's men finally dispersed on 
kumpSni orders and he accepted the offer o f 4,000 real per annum. He rational­
ized his position by saying that he was now old and sick, and obeyed all the kum- 
pSni’s commands, to be able to sit and sleep in peace; and that the Sunan had be­
trayed him, going back on his promise.11*5 On 27 Sapar [November 6, 1790] he 
signed a solemn agreement (sSrat prajangji) in the Dutch factory.
In his letter to Batavia of October 28,11,7 Greeve remarked that the Sunan ap­
peared to be withdrawing his support from MangkunSgara. He was informed of 
the latter's decision to accept the 4,000 real and swear the oath to live in peace 
with Yogyakarta on November 1st. On the third of the month,the Sultan said that 
the Yogyakarta Crown Prince would swear a reciprocal oath. Since both sides had 
suffered damage, their claims for compensation would require further assessment.
Greeve had now bought off MangkunSgara, and on the 5th he received news 
that Prang Wadana had fallen out with the "popes." This gave the V .O .C . a much 
better prospect of bringing the Sunan to heel. Only 260 troops had so far arrived 
from Madura, but by November 7 Greeve was able to make up his total of 500 west 
Madurese and 300 from SumSnSp by commandeering men from the personal body­
guards of the two Madurese princes with him in SSmarang.11*8
The Yogyakarta raids did not immediately cease,11*9 but were no longer the 
main focus of attention for the actors on the Sala stage. This was now on the 
Sunan's continuing refusal to surrender his guru to the kumpSni. The Sunan put 
his army on the alert,145 678950 and the kumpSni began to bring in troops from SumSnSp, 
Madura,151 and south India, and later from Yogyakarta and Kaduwang.152 The 
arrival of two Dutch naval officers is also noted.153 154 On 8 Mulud [November 16] the 
Resident visited MangkunSgara and told him that the Company had broken with the 
Sunan and intended to depose him.151* GarSbSg Mulud [the 12th of the month,
145. See Greeve's diary for October 20 and 27, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
146. 260R: mila turut pangran dipati /  sSmana nuju gSrah /  lan anp[r]aos sSpuh /  
mila tumurut kewala /  sarehipun kump[e]ni dipun-turuti /  mung ecaa kang manah II 
amung eca alSnggah aguling /  kang sarira a[ng]raos wus tuwa /  kum[a]saguh 
sa[ng]pupe /  sarta sala sang prabu /  angro[n]cati kSncSng ing jangji /  datan tutu- 
lung yuda /  umiyin asaguh 1 jangji labuhi prakara /  awasana sang nata npo[n]cati 
jangji /  dyan sang nata cidra II. The diarist says, however, that the Sunan's 
brother Mangkubumi had taken part in the fighting (260L).
147. In KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
148. See Greeve's diary, November 5 and 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
149. In fact they continued during the next few weeks: see 260R and 266R.
150. 261R.
151. "Madura" is used in the diary, as it was generally until a much later period, 
to mean only west Madura, from Bangkalan to Sampang.
152. 262.
153. 261R: an "amral laut lan kapitan" (Admiral and Captain).
154. 262.
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November 20, 1790] is described as a time o f deserted markets, and panic and con­
fusion among the Sunan's subjects.155 The Sunan himself did not even appear for 
the customary celebrations. But now he decided to play for time, summoning repre­
sentatives both o f his santri advisers and of the opposing party, led by the Patih. 
More troops, from Sampang, SumSnGp, and Yogyakarta, moved in, and these forces 
were disposed at strategic points around the city . 156 By 17 Mulud [November 25], 
MangkunSgara had already received the first payment o f his annual 4,000 real.
The next day, the Sunan capitulated, handing over five of his advisers—Wiradigda, 
Kanguruhan, Saleh, Pangeran PanSngah and Bahman—to Pangeran Purbaya, who 
brought them to the Dutch factory. From there they were taken to SSmarang.157
The information from Greeve's diary on the events of these weeks can be sum­
marized as follows: on November 5, Greeve decided that it was essential that the 
"popes" be handed over to the Company. When he was informed by Pangeran Pur­
baya on November 9 that the Sunan had decided to "live or die" with them, he made 
a contingency plan in case the Sunan should flee his kraton. MangkunSgara— 
chosen, as Greeve later explained, because he was a formidable man who could 
"maintain himself," whereas the Sunan's son and heir was still a child158—would 
replace him. On the 10th, the 300 SumSnSp troops left SSmarang for Surakarta, 
accompanied by fourteen sepoys and some European troops, presumably the thirty 
soldiers and thirty artillerymen who had arrived on the 8th of the month.159 Many 
of these had been sick, and Greeve had to draw on the already weak SSmarang gar­
rison to make up the strength of this force (Diary, November 9). On the 16th, 
Greeve received news that the Sunan had called up his regents and their armed 
men, some of whom (those from Banyumas) had already reached Surakarta. On the 
18th, news arrived from Yogyakarta that the Sultan had strengthened his forces in 
the field to far more than 2,000 men, and that his mancanagara regents with another
2,000 would approach Surakarta from the east by the morrow. On the 19th, the 
500 west Madurese troops left for Surakarta.160
A review of the above material suggests that Ricklefs' account of this crisis161 
underestimates the Company's military resources, or overstates its military weak­
ness. Ricklefs lists only some of the companies of European troops which arrived 
in Semarang during this time (the Wurttemberg troops but not the 250 from Batavia 
and the other contingents noted above),162 enabling Greeve to strengthen the cen­
tral Javanese garrisons with 100 men each and still to have left a force of 374 men 
to back him up when he left for central Java.163 164 It is true that these European 
forces were very seriously affected by illness169 and that their deployment for the
155. 262R.
156. In the pasowanan kidul, the pakSbonan, around the MangkunSgaran, and on 
the south side of the pasar pon (leaving only the southeast to the Sunan's men).
157. 263R.
158. Greeve to Batavia, December 1, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
159. Greeve to Batavia, November 8, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
160. Diary, November 18, and Greeve to Batavia, November 20, in KA 3833, 
VOCOB, 1792.
161. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, ch. 9, esp. pp. 324-26 and 333-36.
162. See above, p . 90.
163. See above, p. 92.
164. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 326 and 333-35.
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south-central Javanese operation could only be achieved at the cost of weakening 
the Company's other garrison posts; but the Company had also a second arm to its 
military strength in the "native auxiliary" forces. Apart from the 500 Madurese 
noted by Rieklefs,165 Greeve had also obtained 300 men from SumSnep and had 
assembled in SSmarang the large force of soldiers mentioned above.1®6 One should 
not discount the degree to which the services of such troops could be relied upon, 
especially in view of the fact that the V.O.C. had advanced very large sums of 
money indeed to Greeve for the purpose of hiring them.167 This assessment of the 
Company's resources leaves out of consideration the question of how the different 
central Javanese forces—those of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, estimated at between 
4,500 and 7,000 men, those of MangkunSgara, now estimated at 2,000, and those 
of the Sunan himself, estimated at 7,000168—would in fact have aligned themselves 
had it come to war.
Retreat
In the event it did not come to war; for on November 20 the Surakarta Resident 
sent news that the Sunan had decided to relinquish the "popes"—himself suggesting, 
in fact, that the foremost among his previously most confidential counselors should 
be executed. Greeve interpreted this to mean that the Sunan would rather take 
this drastic step than merely hand them over to the Company, because they "knew 
too much." He told him that the Company did not require their deaths, although 
he thought that, if the Sunan should insist on this, it would at least be a salutary 
example to other potential troublemakers.169 He asked the Sunan that the replace­
ments to the posts vacated by the popes should be "honest men" (brave lieden) 
and, for these appointments only, should swear an oath of loyalty to the Company. 
On November 26, news came that the Sunan had handed over the five "chief popes" 
(as named in the diary) to Pangeran Purbaya, who took them to the V.O .C. fort.
The Sunan was granted the Company's forgiveness and the troops began to dis­
perse.
On December 1, Greeve wrote to Batavia explaining his strategy: he had not— 
however it might have appeared from what he had said—intended actually to depose 
the Sunan without the Governor-General's authorization, but had judged it useful 
to give the impression that he did in fact intend to take this ultimate step. His 
plan to put MangkunSgara on the throne had been purely a precaution for the even­
tuality that the Sunan himself took the step of leaving his capital.
From this point on, a "reconciliation" between the Sunan and the Dutch began, 
and the troops and officers and kumpSni officials began to return to their normal 
posts.170 The Sunan dismissed another o f his officers, TumSnggung Sujanapura, 
on the kump&ni's request,171 and resumed the social niceties. He visited the Dutch 
in their factory and even, the diarist records, drank alcohol (as did his dignitaries)
165. Ib id ., p. 335.
166. See above, pp. 95-96.
167. See above, note 144.
168. See Greeve's diary November 5 and 18, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
169. See Greeve to Batavia, November 25, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
170. 264L-268L.
171. 268L.
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to please them, although he usually took only tea or co ffee .172 He had not drunk 
alcohol in earlier gatherings with Dutch officials.173 174
As the Dutch troops were dispersing, the diarist records that strange things 
happened in Sala: a jajal17k arrived and caused great uproar in and about the 
Sunan's palace. Later the sound of drums and rifles was heard: those in the east 
of the city thought it came from the west, and vice versa.
This was the end of the crisis: after this, and for the rest of the period cov­
ered by the diary, Surakarta life returned to its normal tenor, which was not, as 
we have seen, entirely dull.
The crisis did, however, leave behind some problems which were not to be re­
solved within the period covered by the diary. The damage claims by both sides 
were finally settled as follows: the Surakarta side estimated their losses at 16,000 
real and the Sultan his at 10-11,000. The Sultan, therefore, agreed to pay 4,000 
to Surakarta, which was accepted as satisfactory.175 There is no record of what 
part of the 4,000 real went to MangkunSgara.
It is clear from the V.O .C. letters of the period immediately following that the 
alliance of interests between the two Surakarta princely houses had now definitely 
broken down, as a result of the different ways in which Pakubuwana and Mangku­
nSgara had withdrawn from confrontation with the Company. The Company, how­
ever, once it had brought about the peaceful installation of the Yogyakarta Crown 
Prince (this took place on April 2, 1792),also wished to ensure the succession of 
MangkunSgara's heir, Prang Wadana, to his grandfather's position, supported by 
the same grant of land and labor, the 4,000 cacah granted to MangkunSgara by 
Pakubuwana III. Pakubuwana IV objected to making this grant hereditary, saying 
that he had a numerous family to provide for, and that his father had granted the
4,000 cacah for MangkunSgara's lifetime only. He requested that the grant to 
MangkunSgara's heir be reduced to 2,000 cacah, or that at the very least, all 
MangkunSgara's holdings over and above 4,000 cacah should be surrendered: these 
included the wadana-ship of Banyumas and the districts of PanjSr and PamSrden. 
Governor P. G. van Overstraten, considering 4,000 cacah the necessary minimum 
endowment to maintain the MangkunSgaran house as a substantial ally for the Com­
pany, accepted the second proposal, and an agreement was drawn up at a confer­
ence between Governor and Sunan on August 8, 1792. Prang Wadana would be a 
Pangeran, but would not bear his grandfather's "high title" of Pangeran Adipati.176
172. 265R: sang nata angu[n]juk awis /  sabSn-sabSn sang nata angu[n]juk 
wedang II mangke miturut walanda /  marma nata ngu[n]juk awis /  upruk lan dSler 
lautan /  kang pinSndet ingkang galih /  angecani kump[S]ni /  santana patih tumi&ng- 
gung /  nginum awis sadaya ajrih tumurut kump[S]ni I. . .  . The diarist makes it quite 
clear that the drinking of alcohol was a special departure from the Sunan's usual 
custom. In the MangkunSgaran, of course, alcohol was regularly served at festivi­
ties.
173. See, for example, 251R (the Sunan's reception of Greeve).
174. 264R. jalal (or dajal) is the Antichrist who, according to Muslim eschatol­
ogy, will appear before the Day of Resurrection. The diarist records his alleged 
appearance in the briefest terms and it is a matter of speculation whether or not 
this is intended as an omen of the imminence of the last days.
175. See Greeve to Batavia, May 10, 1791, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
176. See van Overstraten to Batavia, April 2, April 25, July 15 and November 3, 
1793, in KA 3859, VOCOB, 1793.
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Near the end of the diary,177 178the diarist gives an analysis of MangkunSgara's 
political position. Once again, she compares him with a wong anggur17S ( lir ngang- 
gur saumpama) , but claims also that he is "acknowledged as the child" (ingakSn 
anak) of the Company, in contrast to the rulers of Sala [Surakarta] and of Mataram 
[Yogyakarta], who, with all the people of Java, are ruled (kareh) by the Governor 
[of the northeast coast], for it is the Company which possesses supreme authority. 
She goes on to say that, because MangkunSgara does not owe service to the Sunan, 
he does not have to attend court at the GarSbSg celebrations, as the Bupati do.
This is an extremely interesting formulation. First, we see MangkunSgara, 
who had for so long relied on his own strength, now in his old age brought to 
accept the fact that it was the Company that guaranteed his present position. 
Second, we find an acknowledgment of Company rule over the whole of Java, in­
cluding the Sunan and the Sultan. The sources used by Ricklefs, in contrast, 
apparently present this relationship between the Sultan and the Company as one 
of alliance, rather than of dependency on a sovereign power.179 Sometimes the 
relationship is described in familial terminology: the Governor-General is the eyang 
(grandfather) of the Javanese rulers. MangkunSgara also represents his relation­
ship with the Company in this terminology, though the word used (anak, "child") 
implies rather less distance. In the case of the Sunan and the Sultan, however, 
the relationship is presented as one of power and subordination unmodulated by 
these familial overtones: they are "ruled" by the Company. This is not the only 
acknowledgment from a Javanese source of the Company's power over all Java,180 
but it is nevertheless interesting in that it comes from within the central Javanese 
aristocracy, and suggests—even given its tendentious desire to point up the impo­
tence of MangkunSgara's rivals, the Sunan and the Sultan—that the extent of Com­
pany power over all Java was by no means discounted there, even by those who 
would have been reluctant to acknowledge it publicly.
The diarist's other claim, that MangkunSgara was not obliged to attend court 
at the GarSbSg celebrations, ran counter to the explicit provision among the terms 
of the 1757 agreement that he should do just this.181 It is equally clear from the 
diary that MangkunSgara actually attended the Sunan's court as little as possible 
and, as noted above, Resident Palm had on one occasion reported him to higher 
authority for not attending the GarSbeg Mulud celebrations.182 Attending or not 
attending on the occasion of the GarSbSg was a matter of particular significance, 
for it was then that all those who owed service to the Sunan were expected to ap­
pear at court as evidence of their continuing loyalty; and even during the period 
of his political alliance with the Pakubuwanan kraton, such a public affirmation 
of subordinate status was something that MangkunSgara avoided as long as pos­
sible .
177. 292L.
178. On the use of the term "wong anggur" to indicate a person who was not bound 
to perform service for anyone, see note 45 above.
179. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 371-425.
180. See Ann Kumar, "Javanese Historiography in and of the 'Colonial Period': A 
Case Study," in Perceptions o f the Past in Southeast Asia, ed. Anthony Reid and 
David Marr, Asian Studies Association of Australia Southeast Asia Publications 
Series no. 4 (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 187-206.
181. See Hartingh to Batavia, March 29, 1757, in KA 2802, VOCOB, 1758.
182. See above, p. 71.
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Conclusion
The juxtaposition of the diary record and the account given in the V.O.C. let­
ters of the period gives the historian a perhaps unique opportunity to compare two 
types of original record, one Dutch and one Javanese, before their reworking into 
official "histories." One might very well expect that records from two such diver­
gent organizations as a Javanese princely kraton and a Dutch trading company 
would differ greatly in their perceptions of the important issues of the period.
The comparison made here reveals that this is not the case. The area where the 
two records coincide is greater than where they diverge, and their divergence can 
be attributed more to the necessity of both sides keeping certain secrets, and to 
imperfections in their means of gathering information, than to differences in their 
perception of the overall situation.
Taken together, the diary and the V.O.C. records of the time provide suffi­
cient evidence (despite the problems, discussed below, in using this material) to 
attempt a reconstruction of MangkunSgara's role in Surakarta politics and the 
motivation behind his actions. Three decades before the development of the crisis 
described above, the V.O.C. had made, and then perpetuated, the mistake of leav­
ing MangkunSgara, and his large household of family and followers, without a secure 
provision for their support, in immediate proximity to one of the two major Java­
nese princely houses. The Company envisaged MangkunSgara as a "wall" between 
these two houses, and its officials referred to him as "our prince," expecting loyal 
service from him. Yet he had profited from his alliance with the V.O .C. only to 
the extent of receiving a small endowment, which was, moreover, not even secured 
to his heirs. After several decades in this unsatisfactory position, and with any 
hope of further advancement from the Company unfulfilled, it was hardly surpris­
ing that he and his heirs should consider whether a different alliance would bring 
better returns. As we have seen, even the weak and old Pakubuwana III showed 
interest in finding out whether MangkunSgara was prepared to intensify his quar­
rel with Yogyakarta, or not.183 And when his more aggressive son embarked upon 
a policy of "standing firm against Mataram and the Company" (that the two were 
inseparably linked in the Surakarta view is one of the interesting insights provided 
by the diary), MangkunSgara had to decide how much he stood to gain or lose if 
he agreed to join the Sunan, and therefore enquired from Greeve whether the Com­
pany did in fact intend to give him or his descendants the throne of Mataram when 
the Sultan died, as he claimed he had been promised. It is clear that his sons and 
grandsons, moved by the fire of youth and their uncertain prospects, were also 
exerting considerable pressure on him to grasp the initiative firmly at this point. 
When (by September 4th) he had ascertained that the Company denied his claims 
to the throne of Mataram (and even reproached him for making them), he formed 
an alliance with Pakubuwana IV, at the same time demanding of Greeve such an 
impossibly high price for his continued cooperation with the V.O.C. that he must 
have felt himself to be in a position to take a very hard line with the Company. 
Whether he calculated that he would be able to reduce his price in subsequent 
negotiations should the development of events make rapprochement with the V.O.C. 
the wiser course, we are not really in a position to know. MangkunSgara subse­
quently abandoned his alliance with Pakubuwana for two related reasons: the Su­
nan had left the MangkunSgaran forces to do the fighting on their own (the diarist's 
claim is borne out by the archival evidence); and, after initial successes against 
the Yogyakarta forces, Mangkunegara's men began to get the worst of the passages 
of arms. He therefore agreed to accept Greeve's offer of 4,000 real per annum,
183. See above, p. 70.
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which he had earlier refused. Nevertheless, we can see from the diary that this 
yielding to the Company's pressure was something which he felt had to be excused. 
He did so on the grounds of his age and the Sunan's failure to give him the support 
promised. These are grounds peculiar to his particular situation, and there is no 
evidence that he felt warfare was no longer conceivable as the ultimate political 
stratagem by this period.181* Rather, failure to live up the MangkunSgaran martial 
values was something which had to be explained away.
The above account has dealt with the crisis of 1790 in rather more detail than 
is found in Ricklefs' chapter on the subject,184 85 particularly on the issue of the 
name "Mangkubumi," Hartsinck's role, the military preparations of the V.O.C.
(troop movements July to September 1790), and Pakubuwana IV's different propos­
als. Such detailed treatment has brought out certain questions of interpretation.
On the central question of Pakubuwana IV's aims, Ricklefs has concluded that 
Greeve allowed himself to be fed a "mass of rumor" by those at court who had lost 
out in the Sunan's replacement of his chief officials, and should have realized that 
Pakubuwana wanted no more than what he had requested on October 3: that Sura­
karta be recognized as the senior kraton, that the money from the pasisir should 
be paid entirely to Surakarta, and that the pengulu of Surakarta should be senior 
to those of Yogyakarta and of SSmarang. He did not, contrary to "rumor," wish 
to attack the V .O .C ., but in fact desired to obtain its support for Surakarta's 
position.186 Before dismissing these reports as rumor, however, it is worth re­
marking that Greeve and other representatives of the V.O.C. had to operate with­
in a context in which virtually all their information on the political aims of the 
Javanese aristocracy was acquired aurally, through the personal testimony of those 
involved at the center or at the periphery. Neither the Sunan nor his fellow princes 
produced council minutes, or other records supplying evidence of firm decisions 
officially taken. The later historian, like the V.O .C. officials, is therefore in a 
difficult position, and must have good reason for preferring one personal testimony 
and dismissing another, since each of them has the standing of one version of the 
truth which a particular person wished to purvey to a specific audience on a spe­
cific occasion.187 In these circumstances, we must ask whether there is reason to 
believe that Pakubuwana IV was more candid in making that particular request than 
the courtiers were in their statements—or, indeed, than Pakubuwana himself was 
on other occasions when he requested other things, such as the division of Mataram 
or, again, the unification of the two kingdoms by means of a marriage between him­
self and a Yogyakarta princess. It seems to the present writer that the courtier's 
allegations that Pakubuwana IV was planning to attack the Company are compara­
tively better corroborated: the diarist's record shows that he certainly asked 
Mangkunggara to join him in an attack against Yogyakarta and the Company, and 
this is confirmed also by a Yogyakarta text which alleges that the Sunan wished 
to conquer Yogyakarta and annihilate the Dutch, as well as to recover the pasisir.188
184. This point is discussed below, p. 109.
185. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, ch. 9.
186. Ibid., pp. 329-31. (The date is given here as October 11 but, as remarked 
above [n. 137], the Sunan had already made this proposal on the 3rd.)
187. The Company's problem in dealing with this sort of testimony is well exem­
plified by their difficulty in deciding whether Brangtakusuma and his brothers 
"really," as they periodically claimed, wanted to settle down as law-abiding sub­
jects: see above, p. 74.
188. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 318-19. The connection between getting rid of the
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In attempting to assess how firm Pakubuwana IV really was in his commitment 
to this proposal made to MangkunSgara, we are faced with a difficult problem fun­
damental to the historian's understanding of other cultures at other times: the 
interaction of individual personality, social and political conditions and institutions, 
and what may be broadly termed "cultural factors." From the evidence of his 
later career, there can be little doubt that Pakubuwana IV was neither distin­
guished in military leadership nor a particularly astute politician. In P. B . R . 
Carey's detailed analysis of the "sepoy conspiracy" we see this Sunan once more 
employing the tactic he had used with MangkunSgara: encouraging another party 
to act openly against a common enemy, and then leaving his ally in the lurch.* 189 
Since this tactic would seem to have accomplished little beyond exasperating both 
parties with him, his use of it can, with some justification, be seen as indicating 
that Pakubuwana personally lacked the capacity to follow through his chosen 
strategy. Yet his strategies themselves do not appear eccentric or even atypical 
if we view them against the background of political behavior throughout the eigh­
teenth century. Indeed, it is possible that in making this multiplicity of proposals 
the Sunan was reproducing a common pattern: a preliminary process of bargaining, 
bluff, and exploratory moves, which would eventually lead to a realignment of the 
chief political forces according to the balance of strengths and weaknesses revealed 
by this very process. As a new contender for power, Pakubuwana IV was attempt­
ing to establish how far and by what means he could improve his present position. 
In a sense, he desired all the things which he had proposed, or, more precisely, 
all those that a working alliance could bring about. Since this process inevitably 
made not only allies but also enemies, it had, under the conditions prevailing be­
fore 1755, which encouraged individuals to pursue their interests by taking up 
arms, naturally led to a determination of the strength or weakness of the different 
parties by force majeure. What Pakubuwana IV apparently did not realize was that 
not only did the V.O .C. not wish to see central Java undergo another of the polit­
ical rearrangements or shakedowns which this form of political maneuvering brought 
about, but that it was able to deploy very considerable resources to prevent this. 
The Company did not wish the contestants to reenter the arena to determine their 
respective military and political strengths--which was in a sense ironical, since it 
had itself supplied not a little of the motivation behind the contest. On a number 
of occasions during the eighteenth century, the Company's support had been cru­
cial in making and un-making rulers, from the unfortunate Mangkurat III onwards. 
It must have been quite clear to Javanese of high birth from their own and their 
fathers' political experience that the V .O .C .'s  decisions were based only partly on 
considerations of legitimacy, and for the rest on considerations of political expe­
diency. The Company had entered into alliances with those princes with whom they 
could profitably be concluded. Such princes had to be, obviously enough, those 
who were willing to cooperate (at least after a certain point in their careers).
They also had to be, at least when the Company found itself hard pressed, men 
able to command a substantial following and to maintain themselves against opposi­
tion. In view of this, it was quite natural for an ambitious man both to try to 
prove that his was the more legitimate claim (as MangkunSgara's own son Pangeran 
PurbanSgara was to do in 1792 when he attempted to convince the visiting Governor
Dutch and reclaiming the pasisir and its enormous revenues (of which the central 
Javanese rulers now received only a tiny percentage) needs no elaboration. While 
quoting this text, Ricklefs describes its account of Pakubuwana's plans as "un­
likely. "
189. P. B. R. Carey, "The Sepoy Conspiracy of 1815 in Java," BKI, 133 (1977), 
pp. 294-322.
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van Overstraten that he, and not Mangkun§gara's grandson, Pangeran Surya 
Prang Wadana, should succeed as MangkunSgara II190), and to establish himself, 
by force if necessary, as the most formidable figure in his own circle. Since the 
Javanese aristocracy was growing rapidly (the MangkunSgaran birth-rate was not 
exceptionally high) and its resources were not, there were many who were inter­
ested in establishing their preeminence. Mangkun8gara's inability to prevent his 
sons from plotting among themselves to cut out other sons from the available appa­
nage lands mirrors on a relatively small scale the situation in the aristocracy as a 
whole.191
Yet the Company was by the late eighteenth century firmly set against the 
emergence of the "naturally strong," though when it appeared that his attempts 
to preserve the status quo had failed and a violent resolution was likely, Greeve 
reverted once more to the old strategy in his proposal to replace the intransigent 
Pakubuwana IV with MangkunSgara, known as someone who could "maintain him­
self." He did not, in the event, need to use this strategy, because Pakubuwana 
backed down before the break with the Company became irreparable.
If Pakubuwana IV appears to have been neither particularly astute nor heroic, 
a man more prone to start things than to carry them through, a historian interested 
in the personal contributions of the crucial figures in this crisis would have to add 
that the V.O.C. representatives appear in no more favorable colors. Of the two 
First Residents at Surakarta who had been sent there with the expectation that 
they would be vigilant, polite, and ingratiating, alert to the development of trends 
harmful to the Company and quick to initiate the action necessary to abort them, 
neither had fulfilled these expectations. Palm had, by his excessive demands for 
labor, his interference in court judicial proceedings,and his general rudeness, 
given the Sunan and his family reason to feel badly oppressed by the V .O .C .; 
with the arrival of Hartsinck an arrogant Resident was replaced by one so com­
plaisant and venal that he was prepared to keep silent, as those who had earlier 
been forced to accept humiliation prepared their resurgence, and maintained his 
faineant stance as tension between the two principalities rose to a level which his 
superiors would have considered dangerous to the Company’s interest.
If the Surakarta Residents’ shortcomings contributed significantly to the Com­
pany's unpreparedness to deal quickly and informedly with developments there, it 
is questionable how well Governor Greeve dealt with these developments once they 
became his responsibility. He was, as Ricklefs suggests, a person of no great 
personal courage.192 It is clear from his diaries that his favored tactic was to re­
frain from doing anything to make the Sultan and Sunan suspect that the Company 
was in any way displeased with them so long as he himself was at their courts; but 
to instruct the Residents to take a "hard line" with them once he was safely back 
in SSmarang. He tended also to take a stand on an issue but subsequently to with­
draw from it or change his mind; as when, for example, he withheld payment of 
the strandgelden (the sum paid each September as rent for the pasisir and its in­
comes) but shortly afterwards let both rulers have them after all.193 He was given 
to sermonizing, especially in his letters to the young Pakubuwana IV, whom he on
190. This attempt on PurbanSgara's part is reported in van Overstraten to Bata­
via, November 3, 1792, in KA 3859, VOCOB , 1793.
191. See above, p. 82.
192. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 326-30, gives an amusing description of one of 
Greeve's court visits,when his liability to take fright became fully apparent.
193. See above, p. 91.
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one occasion exhorted to be magnanimous like the "truly great princes" of the 
world.194 Such an exhortation is hardly likely to have had the desired effect on 
a young Sunan bent more on the exercise of princely powers than of moral restraint 
(and indeed, it is hard to see what other truly great princes Greeve had in mind as 
exemplars). Finally, his letters do not seem to reveal a well-developed political 
judgment: in many instances he appears to be striving to maintain a "balance" so 
delicate as to be, in practical terms, inoperable. We see this in his efforts to pre­
pare the Sultan to take to the field in defense of Yogyakarta against MangkunS- 
gara's "outrageous pretensions" to its throne, while at the same time enjoining the 
old and choleric ruler against any premature action; and in his efforts to preserve 
not only peace on "blessed Java" (as he frequently calls it, apparently without 
irony) but also a "sufficient" (though not "excessive") degree of rivalry between 
the two principalities. Although he directed the military preparations competently 
enough, his ineptitude with the Javanese princes may well have increased their 
exasperation with the Company and unwillingness to cooperate with it.
It would seem then that, as far as the personal qualities of its representatives 
were concerned, the Company cannot have been at an advantage. When, among a 
small representation, three of these were Palm, Hartsinck, and Greeve, it is not 
surprising that much of its information was inaccurate or late and its tactics some­
times counterproductive. Nevertheless, the Company did enjoy significant advan­
tages. The small size of its personnel was a source of strength as well as some­
times of weakness; and on the whole its personnel were at least reasonably subject 
to discipline ("united," in view of the behavior of a number of its Residents, would 
certainly be an untenable claim). Even its most dubious employee, Hartsinck, 
begged and was granted forgiveness for the faults he had committed.195 This 
ability to impose discipline is in marked contrast to the Surakarta aristocracy, 
where even the MangkunSgaran, which probably really did possess the high degree 
of corporate spirit and loyalty to its leader which the diarist lays stress upon, was 
not able to control the ambitious young scions of its line. Within the kraton cor­
porate unity depended very much on this type of comparatively weakly institution­
alized esprit de corps; the V .O .C ., on the other hand, had a well-established 
chain of command,in which it was much clearer who had the right to give orders, 
and what constituted insubordination or dereliction of duty.
There are several reasons for this contrast. The Dutch employees of the 
V.O.C. were foreigners in a land where life would have been difficult for them if 
they abandoned their loyalty to the Company and decided to chance their own arm 
or make other alliances. Though outright defections had occurred, they were few 
in number.196 Again, the Company's employees were bound by economic ties much 
more directly to their employers than was the case for those in the service of Java­
nese princes. Despite the stereotype of the underpaid, and therefore corrupt and 
disloyal, Company servant, those who rose to respectable rank were well compen­
sated and knew that they would enjoy the fruits of office.197 The Company was
194. See his letter to Pakubuwana IV of May 15, 1790, enclosed in Greeve to 
Batavia, May 19, 1790, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
195. See Greeve to Batavia, July 20, 1791, in KA 3857, VOCOB, 1793. Had the 
full extent of Hartsinck's activities been known, this forgiveness would almost cer­
tainly not have been granted.
196. A number of Europeans had actually defected from the Company to fight with 
MangkunSgara himself in the early 1750s: see Louw, Derde . . . Oorlog, p. 75.
197. The Company was not as unsympathetic in the matter of "private trading" by
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able to allot financial rewards to those who rendered loyal and able service more 
easily than a Javanese ruler, whose resources were mainly in land and manpower 
and therefore hard to prise from one person and transfer to another. Competition 
for such resources was difficult to regulate.198 19 The greater liquidity of its eco­
nomic resources was an enormous advantage to the Company in its military cam­
paigns: for the military arrangements described above (only the beginnings of the 
projected warfare) Batavia sent Greeve almost ten times the amount which the Su- 
nan and the Sultan each received annually from the rent paid them for the pasi- 
sir .199 Yhe V.O .C. had assumed the control of, and the power to tax, the commer­
cial productivity of Java and, even though, like the Javanese princes, very much 
of its revenue was in kind, the Company's basis in a well-developed commercial 
network meant that these revenues could be converted and used for ambitious 
enterprises beyond the scope of any prince. Both the Sun an and the Sultan saw 
the desirability of tapping the Company's liquid funds by obtaining loans, though 
the amounts involved were not particularly large in terms of the sums the Com­
pany's senior employees had at their disposal for their commercial enterprises.200 
The effect of economic constraints on MangkunSgara's ability to maintain a signifi­
cant army, and the development of the MangkunSgaran's economic dependency 
upon the Company, have been discussed in the first part of this article.
If the Javanese aristocracy lacked the V .O .C .'s institutional and economic 
mechanisms for unified action, this is not to say that they were not bound by com­
mon ties at all. To depict Pakubuwana IV himself simply as an ambitious schemer 
furthering his own ambitions by miscellaneous stratagems would be an inaccurate 
representation of his role. But the ties which bound the aristocracy together, and 
which directed and limited Pakubuwana's ambitions, were rooted in the moral and 
cultural environment rather than in more formal arrangements, and their hold over 
individuals and groups is therefore difficult to measure. This is exemplified by 
Pakubuwana's appeal to Islam. The present writer feels that Ricklefs' suggestion 
that Pakubuwana IV was advancing a faction committed to pre-Islamic Javanese 
beliefs is not supported by the diary or by the Dutch archival material, despite 
Raffles'suspicion in 1815 that this Sunan was then conspiring with Indian sepoys 
to restore "Hindu" rule.201 A detailed study of this so-called "sepoy conspiracy"202
its employees as is sometimes thought. In April 1786, for example, it advanced 
loans of 2, 500 guilders to Siberg (the then Governor of the northeast coast) and 
1,500 guilders each to the First Residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta for private 
trade. The Sunan received a smaller loan (1,000 guilders) at the same time. See 
entry for April 20, 1786, in the accounts given in KA 3628, VOCOB, 1787.
198. See Part I, note 164, on MangkunSgara's difficulties in attempting to regulate 
his appointees' use of the economic resources under their control.
199. See above, note 144. Conversion of the rijksdaalder (in which the campaign 
accounts are given) to the real (Spanish dollar, of which the Sunan and the Sultan 
received 10,000 per annum for the lease of the pasisir lands) can be done by cal­
culating 50 stuiver to the rijksdaalder and 64 to the real. (Note that there is an 
error in the table in E. Netscher and J. A. van der Chijs, De Munten van Neder- 
landsch Indie, Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap, 31, 2 [1864], p. 
55, where the real is given at 80 stuiver in 1785.)
200. On the Sunan, see above, note 197, and on the Sultan, Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, 
pp. 121 and 246.
201. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 333.
202. Carey, "Sepoy Conspiracy," pp. 300-3.
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does not provide evidence that Pakubuwana really shared the Indian sepoys’ reli­
gious beliefs, however much he may have been interested in their Hindu ceremonies 
and in the shared religious past of India and Java. What he may well have shared 
with them is an early mode of cultural nationalism—some might say xenophobia—in 
the face of European encroachment, of which a previous manifestation in the period 
covered here may be seen in his banning of European dress in favor of Javanese 
or Middle-Eastern styles. On the other hand, it is clear from both Dutch and Java­
nese accounts that Pakubuwana was making a considerable effort to appear as a 
patron and promoter of Islam, regularly attending the Friday prayer, and some­
times himself delivering the kutbah, instructing his men on the duty of performing 
the prayers regularly, building a replica of the DSmak mosque, and proscribing alco­
hol and opium. It is less easy to ascertain whether he was personally—as opposed 
to politically—a devout Muslim, though he did specially solicit a Koran written by 
MangkunSgara and was at least well enough schooled to make a convincing instruc­
tor and kutbah-reader. Nor is it claimed that a Javanese aristocrat of this period 
would have considered that obedience to the prescriptions of Islam meant, neces­
sarily or potentially, a proscription of those elements of his cultural and intellectual 
life which derived from other,,older Javanese traditions.203 204 What remains is a 
strong support of Islam, a policy which his forefathers had also considered proper 
or useful: his grandfather, Pakubuwana II, had been the founder of a number of 
pSsantren, including the famous TSgalsari, which Pakubuwana IV continued to 
patronize.201* During the reign of his father, Pakubuwana III, it had been a mem­
ber of MangkunSgara's kaum who was appointed as liaison officer between the two 
Surakarta kraton,205 and it is likely that Islam continued to provide links between 
the two kraton under Pakubuwana IV, given its central role in the MangkunSgaran.
The diary provides a perhaps surprising amount of evidence of the dominant 
place of Islam as an organizing principle in at least one Javanese court; and on the 
other hand, no evidence of the currency of pre- or non-Islamic "Javanist" philoso­
phies. This lack of evidence of the latter body of tradition does not prove that it 
played no part in Javanese intellectual life, since the diary is a record of political 
practice and not of philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, the positive evidence of 
this notable practical commitment to Islamic ibadah remains, and it seems likely 
that future scholars will need to reassess the contribution of Islam to norms of 
social and political behavior in eighteenth-century central Java.
There were however perceptible differences in the way the two men, Pakubu­
wana IV and MangkunSgara, expressed their religious commitment: Pakubuwana's 
proscription of alcohol would hardly have been popular in the hard-drinking
203. A related question is the extent to which extra-court representatives of 
Islam, the kyai and the pSsantren community, did feel at this period that commit­
ment to Islam should be exclusive of such elements and might have put pressure 
on the court to follow such a line,as the price for their support of the ruler. The 
evidence for and against this proposition cannot be considered here.
204. TSgalsari was founded by Pakubuwana II in 1742, during his exile after the 
capture of the kraton by the "Chinese" party. He also made other foundations in 
the area. Pakubuwana IV married one of his nieces to the kyai of TSgalsari, and 
gave her as dowry the adjacent village of Karang-gebang as a hereditary grant. 
On TSgalsari, see Onghokham, "The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in 
the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1975), pp. 47-48, 
and for a late nineteenth-century description of this still renowned pSsantren,
P. J. Veth, Java (Haarlem: Bohn, 1875-82), 3, pp. 714-15.
205. See above, p. 70.
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Mangkunggaran. And in general, it seems that the martial pride of the MangkunS- 
garan, where, as we have seen, something of the atmosphere of the "armed camp" 
kraton of earlier decades was still maintained, tended to despise the somewhat 
bloodless tone of the court of Pakubuwana and his brothers. There is an amusing 
description of the abysmal showing made by the Sunan's brother, Mangkubumi, 
at a court dance performance, so that (the diarist claims) even the Resident was 
disgusted at the sight of this "limp priyayi" (priyayi lanas) attempting the martial 
beksa while looking as if he were frightened of something. 206 During the nine­
teenth century a refined, renunciatory official culture would be perfected, which 
is usually referred to by this same term, "priyayi," now carrying a connotation of 
sought-after status. The Mangkunggaran, in contrast, clearly represents the life­
style of the old Javanese noblesse d'&p&e, still insisting on the old martial values, 
but never again to dominate in the way it once had done.
*  *  *
Not all of the general conclusions which seem to emerge from this study of 
political developments in Surakarta accord with those put forward by Ricklefs on 
the basis of his pioneering study of Yogyakarta at the same period—a study which 
is without doubt a remarkable tour de force and a work of immense usefulness, 
without which subsequent scholarly work on these decades would have been im­
measurably poorer. Nevertheless, the evidence for Surakarta, represented by the 
diary in combination with Dutch records, suggests that some of Ricklefs' conclu­
sions regarding the Javanese aristocracy as a whole may need reexamination.
The clear evidence of the court's commitment to Islam—whose influence in cen­
tral Java must be seen, in the opinion of the present writer, to have been much 
stronger than Ricklefs acknowledges—has already been discussed; as has the evi­
dence that Javanese aristocrats were not, after all, impervious at this period to 
the force of the Company's claims (largely unspoken though these were) to "ride" 
them. Ricklefs also diagnoses a major change in the overall political program of 
the Javanese aristocracy during the latter half of the eighteenth century, in which 
they "eliminated" certain political "options," which were found to be no longer 
viable under the changed circumstances of the divided kingdom; and takes the 
Surakarta crisis of 1790 as a watershed in this general trend. He writes: "The 
elder generation of the Javanese courtly elite had accepted the fact of division.
But some of the younger generation had not yet learned the lesson of its necessity. 
They were soon to do so"; 207 and concludes that by the end of the period described 
here the Javanese had "decided warfare could not resolve their central problem."208
This is a large statement, and one which gives rise to certain problems. "The 
Javanese" (even the Javanese ruling class) do not exist as an organic entity any 
more than do "the French" or "the Americans," and, if one wishes to invest them 
with decision-making powers, one must ask by what means they could arrive at a 
consensus for the solution of a problem, or even decide what their "central problem" 
was. The Javanese state was notably weak in institutions by which common pro­
grams could be formulated and carried out, either through a well-established order 
of rank or chain of command (as illustrated by the constant rivalry among the nu­
merous sons of the first Sultan of Yogyakarta who had claims upon the succession,
206. 291L. The term "priyayi" appears to be used here in the sense of "junior 
prince," rather than a member of the bureaucratic nobility.
207. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284.
208. Ib id ., p. 415.
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and between Crown Prince and Sultan), or by conciliar or consultative mechanisms 
(which could not draw in those pangeran and other notables who had decided to 
forsake the court and defy its authority in the regions).209 One becomes increas­
ingly conscious of what a fragile—at times even a notional—thing we refer to as 
"the Javanese state." At the period with which we are concerned, the formaliza­
tion of the cadastral affairs of the principalities, of consultative procedures for 
settling disputes between their respective subjects, and so on, was well underway, 
owing not a little to Dutch pressure in this direction. Yet the problem of obtaining 
a political consensus seems to have remained intractable. We have seen how diffi­
cult it was even for the Mangkunggaran—one among three kraton—to impose a com­
mon political program and an agreed tactical approach on all its members. For the 
aristocracy as a whole, there is no evidence that a consensus was developed through 
either formal or informal consultation: rather the reverse. There is no reason to 
suppose that either the older generation or the younger had, as a whole, learned 
to renounce warfare. Even after his retreat in 1790, Pakubuwana IV would not 
seem to have learned this lesson, in view of his later involvement in the sepoy con­
spiracy. While he seems to have favored the tactic of using an ally as "front man" 
(perhaps a technique learned from his father, who, as we have seen, showed in­
terest in using Mangkunegara in this way), this was, nevertheless, directed to­
wards engineering the overthrow by violence of the established order, from which 
he evidently hoped to profit. (It might also be noted that we find Pakubuwana IV 
pursuing in 1790 another of the old political strategies which Ricklefs sees as hav­
ing now been abandoned—marriage diplomacy.210)
In fact, both the evidence of the diary and that of the V.O .C. archives record 
the existence of a continuing low-level turbulence—by no means every incident of 
which has been mentioned in the present account, which has necessarily been limited 
to developments of major importance. This continuing turbulence beyond, but not 
far beyond, the capitals, came partly from the initiative of Yogyakarta too, for 
sorties were sent out from there when circumstances seemed to suggest that there 
was a chance of seizing an advantage by doing so. If the usual dampening factors 
were significantly weakened, and an ambitious prince decided to seize the opportu­
nity presented, such skirmishes were likely to escalate into warfare on a larger 
scale.
Of the dampening factors which usually prevented such an escalation, the one 
which operated with the greatest consistency was the presence of the V .O .C ., com­
mitted to a far more rigid and permanent political order than the notably fluid one 
which had existed for so long. In analyzing the crisis of 1790, the present writer 
has stressed the relative effectiveness of the V .O .C .'s ordering presence in damp­
ening conflict, at least when it had flared up to an unacceptable level, an effec­
tiveness attributed to its more highly organized structure and its far more mobile 
military and economic resources. Its military forces may have been quantitatively 
inferior to those which the three central Javanese kraton might, hypothetically, 
together have called into the field,had they united in such an effort211—though
209. This aspect of the Javanese state is well described by Ricklefs in ib id ., ch. 
1, esp. pp. 18-26.
210. Ibid., ch. 4,describes the abandonment of marriage diplomacy as a means 
of reuniting the divided kingdom at an earlier period. See, however, p. 93 
above on Pakubuwana IV's attempts to arrange his marriage to a Yogyakarta prin­
cess.
211. Ricklefs states (ib id ., p. 415) that the partition of the kingdom in 1755-57 
rendered unlikely a uniting of Javanese armies against the Dutch. In the present
110
numerical superiority is not the only factor to be considered in calculating military 
advantage—but its economic resources were undoubtedly of a superior order.
If this assessment of the relative effectiveness of the V.O .C. appears to be 
much like a restatement of an old colonial myth, it may perhaps be said that the 
myth contains, at least for a certain period of time, a measure of truth, and that 
it is this which explains the heavy intellectual bonds which it was able to impose 
upon the colonized. At other periods, of course, the colonial strengths may well 
be transformed into weaknesses, since superior economic resources may produce a 
prodigality which can be attacked by those who know how to make do with less, 
and the "perfecting" of military and bureaucratic structures becomes a self-sustain­
ing process with little relation to realities. Then the colonized reveal their own 
strengths, rejecting the role allocated to them by the myth. These strengths 
develop in response to severe problems, and those created by the intrusion of the 
V .O .C . into Javanese life at this period were by no means small. Ricklefs con­
cludes that adaptation to these changed circumstances was only partially success­
ful and very serious problems remained unsolved. He also suggests that, with 
more men of great leadership qualities, such as Mangkubumi and MangkunSgara, 
a new type of political system might have developed. 212 On the evidence presented 
here, could MangkunSgara have been expected to contribute significantly to such 
a renovation? He was, without doubt, a man of great leadership qualities, possess­
ing in superabundance the capacities which had made a prince preeminent among 
his peers in the old way of life. He was a military commander of notable subtlety, 
and himself a great warrior, excelling in archery and horsemanship. He was 
widely respected and beloved for his personal qualities, not just his military prow­
ess but also his excellence in other fields: he was an enthusiastic dancer of the 
bSksa and other traditional styles, and a stern critic of the performance of others; 
and he could as well turn his hand to writing out the Koran and instructing his 
followers on their religious duties. He was not, furthermore, without the capacity 
to change with changing times. Of the three youthful princes—MangkunSgara him­
self, Buminata and Singasari—who had begun their military careers together in 
opposition to the V .O .C ., the two others had persisted in this opposition to the 
end. One died in chains in Batavia and the other in exile in Ceylon. Though 
MangkunSgara himself at first believed that his sheer primacy on the battlefield 
allowed him to insist on accession to the throne of Mataram as sole ruler, something 
the Company could not possibly have countenanced in view of its commitment to 
the existing ruler, he did ultimately accept the necessity of compromise, and was 
provided with a settlement, undoubtedly less than he would have received had he 
made a more correct judgment earlier, but nevertheless better than death or exile. 
At the end of his career we see him reconciled to his situation as the "child of the 
Company," and asking for instruction on how to grow the new export crops whose 
cultivation the Company wished to promote.213 Yet despite his capacity for political 
adaptability and openness to contracting the alliance which seemed most helpful to 
him at a particular juncture (not least in the period whose events are described 
here), there are no signs of the reformer or innovator utilizing a systematic ap­
proach, desiring the construction of new forms of social and political organization
writer's opinion, such a united force was equally unlikely, because of structural 
and institutional weaknesses, under the old, "undivided" kingdom (and had never 
in fact occurred except, arguably, in the 1628-29 campaigns of Sultan Agung). To 
look back to the pre-1755 situation as one of "one king, one kingdom" is to focus 
on an ideal at the expense of reality. But this is another question.
212. Ibid., p. 423.
213. See above, p. 100, and Part I, p. 35.
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better suited to changed times, criticizing the old society and its values as an 
effective process of renovation would have required. It may be that the diary is 
an inadequate reflection of the intellectual dimension of MangkunSgara's personal­
ity ; but there is no other evidence of such qualities in him, and it is reasonable 
to suppose that a prince whose remarkable endowments so destined him for pre­
eminence in the old order was not one we might expect to see as architect of the 
new.
Errata (Part I)
p. 3, note 5: for "metanym or transliteration" read "metonym or tralatition." 
p. 4, line 9: should read "and, at at least weekly intervals. . . . "  
p. 5, note 12: for "Bezantsehapsreizen" read "Gezantschapsreizen."
note 15: for "Nederlantsche" read "Nederlandtsche." 
p. 22, verse 2: for "dikir" read "dikir." 
p. 29, note 162: for "7,354" read "7,794." 
p. 44, verse 2, line 2: for "piyambak" read "tiyambak." 
p. 45, note 244: for "awawuh" read "awuwuh."
Verse separation should occur 
p. 8 between lines 10 and 11 
p. 14 between lines 2 and 3.
p. 15 between "kehnya kang salat ing masjid" and "pan tigang atus sawidak."
